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"The expression 'welljounded fear' is not a precise one; in particular,
it invites debate as to the extent to which the fear depends upon objective facts and the extent to which it reflects the subjective state ef the
1
person concerned. "

Linguistic ambiguity in the refugee definition's requirement of
"well-founded fear" of being persecuted2 has given rise to a wide range
of interpretations. There is general agreement that a fear is "wellfounded" only if the refugee claimant faces an actual, forward-looking
risk of being persecuted in her country of origin (the "objective element"). But it is less clear whether the well-founded "fear" standard also
requires a showing that the applicant is not only genuinely at risk, but
3
also stands in trepidation of being persecuted.
Beyond vague references to the subjective quality of "fear," few
courts or commentators have undertaken the task of explaining what justifies recognition of a subjective element in the first place. What, in the
end, does subjective fear or trepidation have to do with the goals of refugee law? Reasoned explanations are in short supply. This shortfall in
critical thinking has greatly complicated efforts to formulate a coherent
understanding of the subjective element, and clearly to articulate its role
in the analysis of well-founded fear.
Semantic difficulties add an additional layer of complexity to the
debate. Discussions related to the subjective element frequently resort to
indefinite language, itself susceptible to multiple interpretations. This
confusion is evident, for example, in the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee's (UNHCR) Handbook on Procedures and Criteria
I.
Chan v. Minister for Immigr. and Ethnic Aff., [1989] 169 C.L.R. 379, 405 (Aust!.
1989) (Toohey J.).
2.
Under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees the term "refugee"
applies
to any person who ... [a]s a result of events occurring before I January 1951 and
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail
himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being
outside the country of his formal habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted July 28, 1951, art. l(A)(2), 189
U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention]. The 1967 Protocol inter alia removed the
Convention's temporal limitations, omitting the words "[a]s a result of events occurring before
I January 1951 and ..." and the words "as a result of such events." Protocol relating to the
Status of Refugees, done Jan. 31, 1967, art. 1(2), 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
3.
From a strictly textual perspective, this interpretation is understandable. On one
reading, "fear" connotes "[t]he emotion of pain or uneasiness caused by the sense of impending danger...." 5 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 780 (2d ed. 1989).
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for Determining Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention and the
4
1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (UNHCR Handbook),
which contains passages that support almost every imaginable under5
standing of the subjective element. Because non-textual justifications
for the subjective element are few and far between, the proliferation of
discrete understandings has been unconstrained by policy-driven reasonmg.
In contrast to prevailing views, we take the position that there is no
subjective element in the well-founded fear standard. The Convention
definition's reference to "fear" was intended simply to mandate an indi6
viduated, forward-looking appraisal of actual risk, "not to require an
7
examination of the emotional reaction of the claimant." Rather than
predicating access to protection on the existence of "fear" in the sense of
trepidation, the Convention refugee definition requires only the demonstration of "fear" in the sense of a forward-looking expectation of risk.
Once fear so conceived is voiced by the act of seeking protection, it falls
to the state party assessing refugee status to determine whether that expectation is borne out by the actual circumstances of the case. If it is, the
applicant's fear (that is, his or her expectation) of being persecuted
should be adjudged well-founded. Grahl-Madsen rightly observed that
"[e]very person claiming ... to be a refugee has 'fear' ('well-founded' or
otherwise) of being persecuted ... irrespective of whether he jitters at
the very thought of his return to his home country, is prepared to brave
all hazards, or is simply apathetic or even unconscious of the possible
8
dangers."
This understanding of "fear" as forward-looking expectation of risk is
fully justified by one of its plain meanings. While "fear" is most
commonly understood in the sense of trepidation, the term may also be
defined as "a particular apprehension of some future evil . . . (an)
[a]pprehensive feeling towards anything regarded as a source of danger, or
towards a person regarded as able to inflict injury or punishment."9
4.
OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES
AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE
1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES, U.N. Doc. HCP/IP/4/Eng/REV.l
(1979, reedited l 992)[hereinafter UNHCR HANDBOOK].
5.
See, for instance, the confusing and seemingly contradictory positions taken in the
UNHCR Handbook at 'll'll 37-42, 52.
6.
Refugee Appeal No. 71404/99 (Refugee Status Appeals Auth. 1999) (Haines, Deputy Chair) (N.Z.) ("[T]he inquiry into refugee status is concerned only with the prospective
assessment of the risk of persecution.").
7.
See JAMES c. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 67 (1991) ("The concept
of well-founded fear is rather inherently objective ....").
8.
ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 174
(1966).
9.
5 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 780.
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Understood in this sense, "fear" merely denotes the refugee's expectation
of impending persecution. This understanding is consistent with a
common usage of "fear" in standard English, as in expressions such as:
"I fear you are mistaken," "I fear I have bad news for you," "I fear it may
come to that," and "I fear I won't be able to make it to the party." It is
also noteworthy that the verb "craindre," as used in the equally
authoritative French language version of the Refugee Convention, 10 like
"fear"-its English language equivalent"-can be interpreted either in
12
the sense of expectation or trepidation.
The determination of whether an applicant's "fear" (in the sense of
forward-looking expectation of risk) is, or is not, "well-founded" is thus
purely evidentiary in nature. It requires the state party assessing refugee
status to determine whether there is a significant risk that the applicant
may be persecuted. While the mere chance or remote possibility of being
persecuted is insufficient to establish a well-founded fear, the applicant
need not show that there is a clear probability that he or she will be persecuted. Only a "real chance" or "reasonable possibility" of being
13
persecuted needs to be demonstrated.
Because the sole focus of the well-founded fear inquiry is the assessment of an applicant's individuated risk of being persecuted, and
because all evidence relevant to that risk can be considered without a
10.

The French version of the Refugee Convention at Article l(A)(2) reads:

Aux fins de Ia presente Convention, le terme « refugie » s'appliquera a toute personne ... [q]ui, par suite d'evenements survenus avant le premier janvier 1951 et
craignant avec raison d'etre persecutee du fait de sa race, de sa religion, de sa nationalire, de son appartenance a un certain groupe social ou de ses opinions
politiques, se trouve hors du pays dont elle a la nationalite et qui ne peut ou, du fait
de cette crainte, ne veut se reclamer de la protection de ce pays ; ou qui, si elle n'a
pas de nationalite et se trouve hors du pays dans Iequel elle avait sa residence habituelle a la suite de tels evenements, ne peut ou, en raison de ladite crainte, ne veut y
retoumer ..
Refugee Convention, supra note 2, art. l(A)(2).
11.
"Craignant avec raison" is the French language equivalent of"well-founded fear."
12.
"Craindre" may be used in the sense of "apprehender," as in expressions such as: "II
ne viendra pas, je le crains"; "Ne craignez rien"; "Yous n'avez rien a craindre"; "II est a
crainte que cet eleve n'echoue a !'examen"; and "II y a lieu de craindre qu'un orage se prepare." See 3 LE GRAND ROBERT DE LA LAN GUE FRANC¥AISE: DICTIONNAIRE ALPHABETIQUE ET
ANALOGIQUE DE LA LANGUE FRANCAISE 11 (Alain Rey ed., 2d ed. 1985).
See, e.g., INS v. Stevie, 467 U.S. 407, 425 (1987) (requiring a "reasonable possibil13.
ity" of being persecuted); R. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, Ex parte Sivakumaran,
[1988] A.C. 958 (H.L. 1988) (U.K.) (setting the standard as a "reasonable degree of likelihood"); and Chan v. Minister for lmmigr. and Ethnic Aff., [1989] 169 C.L.R. 379, 507 (Austl.
1989) (Toohey, J.) (requiring a "real chance" as distinguished from a "remote" chance of being persecuted). The relevant question is thus effectively " ... whether a reasonable person in
the asylum applicant's circumstances would fear persecution ...." Morales v. INS, 208 F.3d
323, 330 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting Aguilar-Solaris v. INS, 168 F.3d 565, 572 (1st Cir. 1999)).
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subjective element, we maintain that continued reference to distinct subjective and objective elements of the well-founded fear standard is
unhelpful. Indeed, persistent references in the jurisprudence and scholarly literature to such abstract concepts as objectivity and subjectivity are
at least partly responsible for the conceptual confusion that, to this point,
has frustrated the emergence of a shared understanding of the wellfounded fear standard. The analysis that follows elaborates our argument
that there is no subjective element in "well-founded fear." For the sake of
clarity, we avoid resort to the misleading labels ("objective" and "subjective") traditionally associated with the well-founded fear inquiry.
In section I, we set out our view that the traditional bipartite approach to "well-founded fear" is unjustified as a matter of principle and
also impossible practically to implement in a fair and consistent manner.
In particular, there is simply no principled way for decisionrnakers to
evaluate an applicant's state of mind for evidence of trepidation. Because
of the consequent need to rely on largely artificial, surrogate indicators
of trepidation, the bipartite approach as applied results in the denial of
refug~e status to persons who face the risk of being persecuted in their
country of origin, some of whom may, in fact, be fearful. Even when a
more seemingly benign approach to the subjective element is adoptedwith evidence of trepidation considered only as a means of "topping up"
a claim that is insufficiently established on objective grounds-a real
injustice is still likely to occur. Under such an approach, persons whose
fear is readily recognized as such by decisionmakers, as well as those
who are simply more demonstrative, will be advantaged in securing
refugee status for reasons that have nothing to do with the actual risk
faced.
In section II, we suggest that the protection risks associated with the
bipartite test, as well as the fairness concerns raised by use of trepidation
as an essential element or as a "plus factor," can both be avoided by interpreting "fear" in its alternative sense of forward-looking expectation.
We argue moreover that this linguistically sound interpretation is supported by the object and purpose of the Refugee Convention, and is
confirmed by state practice under the equally authoritative French language version of the refugee definition. An interpretation of "fear" as
forward-looking expectation of risk is also more consistent with the internal structure of the Refugee Convention, in particular with the
approach taken in Articles l(C)(5-6) and 33.
In section III, we demonstrate that an understanding of "wellfounded fear" that focuses exclusively on actual risk in no way
undermines the critical importance of conducting a particularized inquiry
into risk. All evidence relevant to a given applicant's actual risk of being
persecuted-including his or her testimony and other individuated
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evidence-is admissible for the purpose of establishing a "well-founded
fear." This is true whether evidence unique to the applicant is treated as
part of a subjective inquiry, an objective inquiry, or simply the inquiry
into actual risk. If, in contrast, the goal of the subjective element is not
just to secure admission of an applicant's evidence, but instead to require
that it be given categorical priority over all other evidence of risk, we
argue that it should be rejected as inconsistent with the responsibility of
the decisionmaker to assign weight to each piece of evidence solely as a
function of its real probative worth. If, on the other hand, the rationale
for maintenance of a subjective element is the need to take account of
evidence of an applicant's particular physical or psychological traits that
result in subjection to harm greater than that experienced by other
persons, then the subjective element is superfluous. These types of
vulnerabilities can, and should, be considered as part of the analysis of
whether the anticipated harm rises to the level of "being persecuted," and
without regard to a subjective element.
I.

CRITIQUE OF THE TRADITIONAL APPROACHES

The dominant view worldwide is that the test for well-founded fear
is comprised of two essential elements. This bipartite approach requires
the applicant to demonstrate a significant, actual risk of being persecuted
("objective element") as well as an emotional state of trepidation with
respect to that risk("subjective element"). A second approach with some
support in current practice treats subjective fear not as an essential element of refugee status, but rather as a "top-up" factor which may be
relied upon to grant refugee status to a person who has failed to show a
significant actual risk of being persecuted.
A. Fear as One of Two Essential Elements:
The Bipartite Approach

While there is some support for a more extreme position-namely,
14
that the applicant's trepidation is the primary, or even the exclusive, 15
focus of analysis-most courts require evidence of objective risk as well,
14.
"That the fear must be 'well-founded' does not alter the obvious focus on the individual's subjective beliefs ...." INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987). Lower courts,
however, have generally required a demonstration of significant risk as well as subjective fear as
a prerequisite to refugee status.
15.
Theodore N. Cox, Well-Founded Fear of Being Persecuted: The Sources and Application of a Criterion of Refugee Status, 10 BROOK. J. INT'L. L. 333, 349 (1984) ("The focus of
inquiry [under the Refugee Convention] is directed towards a person's actual fear and his real and
natural motivation for desiring protection .... [l]f a person's fear is enough to make him flee, it is
well-founded"); See also R. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, Ex pane Sivakumaran, [1988]
A.C. 958, 991 (H.L. 1987) (Keith, L.J.) (U.K.) quoting the analysis of Sir John Donaldson in the
Court of Appeal at [1987] 3 W.L.R 1047, 1052-1053. The House of Lords rejected this approach.
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and therefore decline to find that trepidation alone is sufficient to engage
the Convention obligations of States. Under this bipartite approach there
are two essential elements, each of which must be proved: a finding of
objective risk, and a determination of subjective fear or trepidation.
The articulation of the well-founded fear standard in the UNHCR
Handbook offers clear support for the bipartite approach:
To the element of fear-a state of mind and a subjective condition-is added the qualification "well-founded." This implies
that it is not only the frame of mind of the person concerned that
determines his refugee status, but that this frame of mind must
be supported by an objective situation. The term "well-founded
16
fear" therefore contains a subjective and an objective element.
The UNHCR position has been adopted by leading courts with only
slight modification. The High Court of Australia, for instance, has noted that
the well-founded fear standard "has both subjective and objective elements
and necessitates consideration of the mental and emotional state of the individual and, also, the objective facts relating to the conditions in the country
11
of his or her nationality." Most senior courts of the common law world18
9
including the House of Lords, United States Supreme Court/ Supreme
20
22
21
Court of Canada, and Irish High Court -have taken the same position.
Despite its wide following, there is increasing recognition that the
bipartite approach poses protection risks that are incompatible with the
object and purpose of the Refugee Convention. Most significantly, the
16.
UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 4, '1138.
17.
Re Minister for Immigr. and Multicultural Aff., Ex pane Miah, [2001] H.C.A. 22, '1162
(Aust!. 2001) (Gaudron, J.).
18.
R. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't. Ex vane Sivakumaran. f!9881 A.C. 958.
1000 (H.L. 1988) (Goff. L.) (U.K.) ("fTlhe expression 'well-founded' ... cannot be read simply
as 'aualifying' the subjective fear of the applicant-it must. in my opinion reauire that an inquiry
should be made whether the subjective fear of the applicant is objectively justified.").
19.
The U.S. Supreme Court-while declining to elaborate a detailed test for "wellfounded fear"-has clearly indicated that the standard is comprised of both objective and subjective elements. Regarding the objective element, the Court has noted that an actual risk of
persecution is required, though "[o]ne can certainly have a well-founded fear of an event happening when there is less than a 50% chance of the occurrence taking place." Cardoza-Fonseca, 480
U.S. at 431. But the standard is not exclusively objective, according to the Court, because "the
reference to 'fear' ... obviously makes the eligibility determination tum to some extent on the
subjective mental state of the alien." Id. at 430-31.
20.
"Both the existence of the subjective fear and the fact that the fear is objectively wellfounded must be established on a balance of probabilities." Chan v. Can. (Minister of Employment and Immigr.), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 593, '11120 (Can. 1995).
21.
Zgnat'ev v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, [2001] I.E.H.C. 70 (Ir. H.
Ct. 2001) ("[F]ear must be well founded and this implies that the applicant's frame of mind must
be supported by an objective situation. The phrase therefore contains a subjective and an objective element.") (referencing UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 4, '1138 ).
22.
There is some minimal support for the bipartite approach in civil law jurisdictions as
well. See, e.g., Up-78/00 (Constitutional Ct. 2000) .(Slovn.), available at http://www.usrs.si/en/index.php?sv_path=9.
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bipartite approach can lead to denial of refugee status to at-risk applicants who either are not fearful, or whose trepidation is not identified as
such by decisionmakers. This concern arises most obviously in the assessment of refugee claims made by children and mentally disabled
persons, who may be unable to experience or to articulate the requisite
emotional state. Most courts have been sensitive to such cases, and have
exempted children and mentally disabled persons from the duty to demonstrate trepidation as a precondition for refugee status. There are
serious practical challenges to identifying precisely when a lack of capacity exists, however, such that dispensation from the usual approach to
"well-founded fear" is warranted. There are moreover other categories of
persons not encompassed by presently recognized exceptions who face
comparable dilemmas in satisfying the subjective prong of the two-part
test. The extraordinary diversity among applicants in terms of culture,
language, and temperament (which may or may not be impacted by prior
incidents of persecution) makes it difficult, at times impossible, for decisionmakers reliably to detect the presence of trepidation, even under the
best of circumstances.
Perhaps with these concerns in mind, Grahl-Madsen observed:
The adjective "well-founded" suggests that it is not the frame of
mind of the person concerned which is decisive for his claim to
refugeehood, but that his claim should be measured with a more
objective yardstick .... In fact ... the frame of mind of the indi23
vidual hardly matters at all.

In line with this understanding, Kalin has noted that "[d]uring the
last decades, a trend has developed to put the main emphasis on the
24
objective elements." For example, the House of Lords observed in Adan
that "(t]he use of the term 'fear' was intended to emphasize the forwardlooking nature of the test, and not to ground refugee status in an
assessment of the refugee claimant's state of rnind." 25 Similarly, the New
Zealand Refugee Status Appeals Authority has held that "the bipartite
23.
GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 8, at 174.
24.
Walter Kiilin, Well-Founded Fear of Persecution: A European Perspective, in ASYLUM LAW AND PRACTICE IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 21, 28
(Jacqueline Bhabha & Geoffrey Coll eds., 1992) (However, because he believes that psychological suffering is often not appropriately validated as part of the "objective" inquiry and that
"freedom from fear is a value in itself," Kiilin hopes that "states, without neglecting objective
factors, would take subjective factors more into account. ..." An evaluation of the "subjective
element" (in the sense of evidence of particularized vulnerability), he argues, will lead to an
increase in the grants of refugee status, furthering the humanitarian aims of the Refugee Convention.)
25.
Adan v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [1999] 1 A.C. 293, 307 (H.L. 1998)
(Lloyd L.J.) (U.K.) (quoting JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 69 (1991)).
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test may have outlived its usefulness. It might even on occasion lead to a
material misdirection as to the nature of the objective component of the
27
refugee definition." 26 Commentators have expressed similar sentiments.
Despite the ever-increasing awareness of the real protection risks associated with the duty to show subjective fear in order to establish a
well-founded fear of being persecuted, many courts and commentators
have nonetheless resisted the notion that well-founded fear does not involve a subjective element of some kind, perhaps because of the
perceived imperative of the "fear" language, or simply because subjectivity has traditionally been assumed to be relevant to qualification as a
refugee. Some courts have reconciled these competing imperatives by
adopting mechanisms which effectively eviscerate the subjective element
of any substantive role in the well-founded fear inquiry, but without formally disavowing the legitimacy of the bipartite test or the duty to
demonstrate trepidation. For instance, the existence of trepidation may
be inferred whenever it is determined that an applicant faces a significant
risk of being persecuted in his or her country of origin. 28 Other courts formally adhering to the bipartite test marginalize the subjective element by
simply declining to perform an analysis of the applicant's emotional
29
state. Although these approaches may minimize the risks associated with
a rigorous inquiry into the subjective element, it seems intellectually dishonest to apply one standard while purporting to apply another. Moreover,
because these approaches do not provide a satisfying justification for
26.
See, e.g., Refugee Appeal No. 70074/96, Re ELLM (Refugee Status Appeals Auth.
1996) (Haines, Deputy Chair) (N.Z.).
27.
Jean-Yves Carlier, General Report, in WHO IS A REFUGEE? COMPARATIVE CASE
LAW STUDY 697 (Jean-Yves Curlier et al. eds., 1997) ("A detailed examination of the subjective element does not seem necessary when evaluating the risk of persecution."); HATHAWAY,
supra note 7, at 67.
28.
See Savchenkov v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, No. 11513, HX/71698/94
(Immigr. App. Trib. 1994) (unpublished) (U.K.) (on file with author). ("The plausibility of the
risk objectively assessed will be relevant to (and may dictate) whether or not the appellant is
believed to have a fear of risk."); Adjei v. Minister of Employment and Immigr., [ 1989] 2 F.C.
680, 'Il 4 (Fed. Ct. App. 1989) (MacGuigan, J.) (Can.) ("In light of the uncontradicted evidence
... as to [the] objective basis for such fear, the Board's reluctance to acknowledge even the
applicant's subjective fear reads strangely."); Al-Harbi v. INS, 242 F.3d 882, 890--91 (9th Cir.
2001) ("Because the strong evidence as to the objective component of a 'well-founded fear of
persecution' claim is therefore relevant in establishing petitioner's subjective fear, to the extent
that any question exists with respect to the genuineness of petitioner's fear, it is answered by
our decision regarding the objective component.") (quoting Aguilera-Cota v. INS, 914 F.2d
1375, 1378 (9th Cir. 1990)).
29.
See Thompson v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, No. 18848, HX/78032/1996
(Immigr. App. Trib. 1998) (unpublished) (U.K.). ("The occasions upon which it would ever be
necessary to decide whether a claimant does actually have an apprehension would, we have
thought, be rare."); Yusuf v. Can. (Minister of Employment and Immigr.), [1992]1 F.C. 629
(Fed. Ct. App. 1992) (Can.) ("I find it hard to see in what circumstances it could be said that a
person who, we must not forget, in by definition claiming refugee status could be right in
fearing persecution and still be rejected because it is said that fear does not actually exist in his
conscience.").
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bypassing the inquiry into an applicant's state of mind, the formalistic
retention of the subjective element leaves open the possibility that judicial decisions will be misunderstood and misapplied.
1. The Risk of Unwarranted Denials of Protection
Because the bipartite approach posits the existence of two essential
elements, it necessarily follows that refugee status must be denied where
an applicant fails to establish that he or she is subjectively fearful. The
simple logic of this observation has not been lost on courts. The Canadian Federal Court Trial Division, for instance, noted that "[t]he lack of
evidence going to the subjective element of the claim is a fatal flaw
which in and of itself warrants dismissal of the claim, because both elements of the refugee definition-subjective and objective-must be
30
met." Similarly, the U.S. Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that
"[i]f an objective basis is shown, the applicant must then show his subjective fear is genuine." 31
The inescapable, and deeply unsatisfying, consequence of the insistence on proof of trepidation is that an applicant found not to be fearful
must be denied refugee status, despite a finding that he or she faces a
real chance of being persecuted if returned to the country of origin. Although seemingly improbable, the Supreme Court of Canada appears to
have offered a chilling endorsement of this very result. In considering
the case of a Chinese national who had fathered two children in violation
of China's "one child policy" and who therefore risked forcible sterilization, Mr. Justice Major observed:
[T]he evidence of the appellant with respect to his subjective
fear of forced sterilization is equivocal at best. However, in the
absence of an explicit finding by the Board on this point, it
would not be appropriate for this Court to determine that the appellant did not have a subjective fear of forced sterilization. 32
In other words, a negative finding with respect to the applicant's subjective fear of forced sterilization would have constituted valid grounds for
denying refugee status.

30.
Kamana v. Can. (Minister of Citizenship and Immigr.), IMM 5998-98, 'JI I 0 (Fed.
Ct. Trial Div. 1999) (Tremblay-Lamar J.) (Can.). See also Maqdassy v. Can. (Minister of Citizenship and lmmigr.), [2002) F.C.T. 182, 'JI 10 (Fed. Ct. Trial Div. 2002) (Tremblay-Lamer, J.)
(Can.) ("[T]he lack of evidence going to the subjective element of the claim is in itself sufficient for the applicant's claim to fail.").
31.
Nasir v. INS, 30 Fed. Appx. 812, 814 (10th Cir. 2002) (Briscoe, J.).
32.
Chan v. Can. (Minister of Employment and Immigr.), [1995) 3 S.C.R. 663, 'JI 132
(Can. 1995) (Major, J.).
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The High Court of Australia has similarly held that even those applicants facing a significant risk of being persecuted are properly denied
33
status where found to lack the required trepidation. In Chan, the Court
found that the first instance tribunal had erred in determining that the
applicant, who had suffered past persecution, did not face a significant
prospective risk of being persecuted. In returning the case for further
consideration, the Court instructed:
If the material before the delegate showed the applicant to be ex-

traordinarily brave or foolhardy it might reasonably be found
that his persecution engendered no fear. But if it were accepted
that [his past persecution] engendered a fear of being persecuted
then it would be unreasonable to characterize that fear as other
than well-founded ... On that latter basis, Mr. Chan's claim to a
well-founded fear of persecution if returned to China might reasonably be rejected if it were found that he no longer held ihat
fear. 34
To make matters worse, when refusing claims for lack of fear, first
instance decisionmakers commonly treat trepidation as a threshold requirement that must be satisfied before an inquiry into risk is even
35
undertaken. In this way, at-risk applicants can be denied protection
without so much as an acknowledgment of their plight. In Thuraisamy, 36
the Full Federal Court of Australia expressly sanctioned this approach:
[I]t is important to note that, at this stage of his reasoning, the
Tribunal member was not addressing issues such as the cause of
any fear of persecution-that is, whether it stemmed from a
33.
Chan v. Minister for Immigr. and Multicultural Aff., [1989] 169 C.L.R. 379 (Aust!.
1989).
34.
Id. (emphasis added).
35.
Naremanov v. Refugee Status Appeals Auth., CP 354/98, 'l[ 32 (H.C. 2000) (unpublished) (Gendall, J.) (N.Z) (on file with author) ("[T]he applicant for refugee status must
establish that there is firstly actual fear of return to a country for a Convention reason, that
being an actual subjective element, and, secondly that objectively the fear is justified."), available at http://www.refugee.org.nz/Casesearch/HighCourt/nvrsaa.htrnl.; Maqdassy v. Can.
(Minister of Citizenship and lmmigr.), [2002) F.C.T. 182 (Fed. Ct. Trial Div. 2002) (Can.)
(denying refugee status based on lack of subjective fear without consideration of objective
evidence of risk); Farah v. Can. (Minister of Citizenship and Immigr.), 1999 F.T.R. 161, 'l[ 24
(Fed. Ct. Trial Div. 1999) (Blais J.) (Can.) ("By failing to demonstrate that she had a subjective fear of persecution, the applicant failed to meet the test established by the Supreme Court
of Canada in Ward, so the panel had no obligation to go further."); Refugee Appeal No. 1191,
Re TLY, and 2/91, Re LAB (Refugee Status Appeals Auth. 1991) (Nicholson, Chairman)
(N.Z.) (stating that the fear must be ascertained first, and only then can it be asked whether the
fear is well-founded), available at http://www.refugee.org.nz/rsaa/text/docs/l-91.htm.
36.
Thuraisamy v. Minister for lmmigr. and Multicultural Aff., [1999] F.C.A. 1632
(Full Fed. Ct. 1999) (Aust!.).
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matter referred to in the Convention definition ... The Tribunal
was concerned, at this stage, simply with the question whether
or not the fear existed. If it answered that question adversely to
37
the applicant's claim, as it did, that was the end of the matter.
Similarly, the Canadian Federal Court Trial Division has found that
"lack of subjective fear constitutes a critical barrier to a refugee claim
which, on its own, justifies non-recognition." 38 Moreover, because reviewing courts typically accord great deference to the impressions of
first instance decisionmakers in matters related to demeanor, credibility,
and veracity, applicants found not to be subjectively fearful (and without
consideration of actual risk) are unlikely to receive meaningful appellate
•
39
review.
Paradoxically, the subjective fear requirement can even impair an
applicant's prospects for obtaining a favorable result on review where his
or her claim was originally rejected for lack of objective risk. For exam40
ple, in the Australian Federal Court case of Suleiman the first level
tribunal denied refugee status on the grounds that applicant did not face
an objective risk of being persecuted for reasons of his political activities. The claim on review was that the tribunal erred in failing to
consider all relevant evidence, including that which indicated a risk of
being persecuted because of his membership in a particular social group.
Noting that the tribunal had not considered all evidence pertinent to the
applicant's membership in the relevant social group, the Federal Court
nevertheless upheld the denial of refugee status:
[I]t is necessary not merely that there be objectively a fear of
persecution by reason of membership of a particular social
group, but that the applicant actually had that fear. It is hard to
imagine how the question of the existence of a particular social
37.
Id. 'II 8.
38.
Anandasivam v. Can. (Minister of Citizenship and Immigr.), IMM-4748-00, 'II 23
(Fed. Ct. Trial Div. 2001) (Lemieux, J.) (Can.).
39.
This is especially true in the United States. See, e.g., Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228,
252 n.23 (3rd Cir. 2003) ("We note that the IJ did not rely on her personal observations of
Dia's demeanor or any other observations to which we must accord an even greater degree of
deference."); Mendoza Manimbao v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 655, 662 (9th Cir. 2003) ("fW]e grant
special deference to the IJ's eyewitness observations regarding demeanor evidence.");
Cordero-Trejo v. INS, 40 F.3d 482, 487 (!st Cir. 1994) ("[C]redibility findings resting on
analysis of testimony rather than on demeanor may 'deserve less than usual deference.'")
(quoting Consolidation Coal v. NLRB, 669 F.2d 482, 488 (7th Cir. 1982)). See also R. v.
Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, Ex pane Sourbah, (1999] Imm. A.R. 452 (Q.B. 1999)
(Eng.) (deferring to the special adjudicator's findings regarding credibility and subjective
fear).
40.
Suleiman v. Minister for Immigr. and Multicultural Aff., (2001] F.C.A. 752 (Full
Fed. Ct. 2001) (Austl.).
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group could arise unless there is some evidence that the applicant ... had a subjective fear of persecution on the grounds of
41
membership of that social group.
In this case, the failure of the applicant to voice his subjective fear of
being persecuted on the grounds of social group membership effectively
excused the tribunal from considering evidence indicative of his risk of
persecution for that particular Convention reason. This result is all the
more remarkable given that the tribunal never made a specific finding as
to the applicant's subjective fear.
As the Suleiman discussion illustrates, the bipartite approach, by its
very nature, admits of the possibility that genuinely at-risk persons will
be denied refugee status. Consequently, the subjective element cannot be
viewed as a mere benign accessory to a well-founded fear inquiry fundamentally concerned with risk. In stealth, it can deny international
protection to persons who are clearly in need of it.
2. The Challenge of Implementation
The normative concerns raised by the bipartite approach are moreover exacerbated by the inherent practical challenges associated with
implementation. Assuming arguendo that it comports with the goals of
refugee law to deny protection to at-risk individuals who, for whatever
reason, are not subjectively fearful, the fundamental illogic of insistence
on proof of trepidation is exposed by the fact that it is generally difficult,
if not impossible, for decisionmakers to determine in a formal hearing
process whether an applicant is genuinely fearful or not.
The bipartite approach clearly assumes the ability of decisionmakers
accurately and reliably to ascertain whether an applicant is subjectively
fearful. The crude investigative tools available to decisionmakers, however, are often ill-suited to unraveling the mysteries of an applicant's
psyche. The analysis of a person's emotional state-an inherently problematic exercise even in the best of circumstances-is especially difficult
42
in the context of refugee law. Indeed, the subjective fear inquiry is so
difficult and fraught with uncertainty that erroneous determinations are
virtually assured. This is especially true where an effort is made to assess
subjective fear based on an applicant's outward demeanor and the content of his or her testimony.
41.
Id. 'l!'ll 15-16.
See Andjongo v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, No. 12341, HX 7491/94 (lm42.
migr. App. Trib. 1995) (U.K.) ("Assuming for the moment that it is a correct statement of law
that the subjective element in the claim for refugee status is the presence of actual fear, because it is a state of mind and exceedingly difficult to contradict, it will be rare indeed for a
finding to be made that it did not exist.").

518

Michigan Journal of International Law

[Vol. 26:505

One factor complicating the inquiry is the considerable diversity
among applicants. Persons of "different nationalities, educations, trades,
experience, creeds and temperaments" are bound to manifest fears in
divergent and unpredictable ways. 43 In particular, persons whose culture
discourages the open display of emotion may present an outwardly stoic
demeanor, despite intense, internal feelings of distress and anxiety. Such
persons are therefore especially likely to be denied refugee status for
failure to demonstrate a subjective fear of being persecuted (regardless
of their actual risk). As Adjin-Tettey has argued, some applicants "may
not appear 'fearful enough' for refugee decisionmakers measuring emo44
tional reaction against a Western male standard," with the result that
they could be excluded "from international protection even though they
may have an objectively strong case."45 She contends that the duty to
demonstrate trepidation particularly disadvantages women required to
testify to sexual violence, as "[ w]omen fleeing gender-related harms
have often not been successful in communicating their subjective fear of
persecution even in the face of strong objective indicators because they
have difficulty relating their claims ... to asylum decisionmakers who
are predominantly men."46
More generally, "[u]nderstandable anxiety affects most claimants
compelled to recount painful facts in a formal and foreign environment."47 Thus, irrespective of culture or gender, a genuinely fearful
applicant might be disinclined openly to display his or her most intimate
emotions in the presence of total strangers and in the sterile atmosphere
of a refugee status hearing. Further complicating the inquiry into an applicant's emotional state are problems related to communication.
Uneducated or inarticulate applicants may be fearful, yet unable to put
their feelings into words. 48 Similarly, fearful applicants forced to communicate through an interpreter may be seen to lack fear where their

43.
Kasolo v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [1996] U.K.l.A.T. 13190 (lmmigr.
App. Trib. 1996) (U.K.) cited in MARK SYMES, CASELAW ON THE REFUGEE CONVENTION:
THE UNITED KINGDOM'S INTERPRETATION IN THE LIGHT OF THE INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITIES 31 (2000); see also R. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, Ex parte Patel, [1986] Imm.
A.R. 208 (Q.B. 1986) (Eng.) (noting the difficulties common with translations and interpreters).
44.
Elizabeth Adjin-Tettey, Reconsidering the Criteria for Assessing Well-Founded Fear
in Refugee Law, 25 MAN. L. J. 127, 131 (1997).
Id.
45.
46.
Id. at 132.
47.
Kopalapillai v. Minister for Immigr. and Multicultural Aff., [1997] F.C.A. 1510
(Fed. Ct. 1997) (Merkel, J.) (Aust!.).
48.
Adjin-Tettey, supra note 44, at 133 ("Only eloquent and articulate women, who are
likely to be part of the elite, may be able to secure refugee protection while the majority may
be denied ... because of their inability to express their subjective fear." ).
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words and expressions are translated in ways that fail fully to convey the
49
extent of their trepidation.
In three common factual scenarios, the subjective fear inquiry has
proved either so difficult to conduct in practice, or simply so fraught
with normative risks, that decisionmakers routinely dispense with the
subjective fear requirement altogether. One such scenario is where the
applicant for refugee status is believed to be suffering from a mental disability or trauma, in particular where the applicant is experiencing Post50
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Persons suffering from PTSD often
do not exhibit outward signs of trepidation, but rather "dissociate" themselves from their reality. It is widely recognized that dissociation is a
51
central characteristic of PTSD, and that persons who dissociate are extremely fearful, despite their outward demeanor. A person suffering the
effects of PTSD
may feel as though the event is not happening to her, as though
she is observing from outside her body, or as though the whole
experience is a bad dream from which she will shortly awaken.
These perceptual changes combine with a feeling of indifference, emotional detachment, and profound passivity in which
52
the person relinquishes all initiative and struggle.
As Bossin and Demirdache conclude, this state of dissociation "is not
one that leads to the type of actions [refugee decisionmakers] typically
associate with a genuine subjective fear. Yet these are the actions-or in53
actions-of people who are afraid."
In addition to affecting demeanor, PTSD may also adversely impact
a traumatized person's ability orally to express information related to his
or her emotional state. Specifically, "trauma may lead to a 'speechless
49.
R. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, Ex parte Patel, [1986] Imm. A.R. 208
(Q.B. 1986) (Webster, J.) (Eng.) ("Although the [doubts cast on demeanor evidence by
MacKenna J.] ... overstate the difficulty of assessing the demeanour of a witness in an ordinary case, when the witness is English speaking, they do not, I feel, overstate the difficulty
and may even understate it ... when most, if not all, of the witnesses would have to give evidence through an interpreter.").
50.
PTSD is common among persons who have experienced the types of trauma frequently found in refugee claims, for instance: assault, detention, kidnapping, torture (mental
and physical), and sexual assault (including rape). Michael Bossin & Laila Demirdache, A

Canadian Perspective on the Subjective Component of the Bipartite test for "Persecution":
Time for Re-evaluation, 22 REFUGE 111 (Mar. 2004 ).
51.
Id. at 112 (citing Bessel A. van der Kolk, The Complexity of Adaptation to Trauma:
Self-Regulation Stimulus Discrimination, and Characterological Development, in TRAUMATIC
STRESS: THE EFFECTS OF OVERWHELMING EXPERIENCE ON MIND, BODY, AND SOCIETY 182,
192 (Bessel A. van der Kolk et al. eds., 1996)).
52.
Bossin & Demirdache, supra note 50, at 112 (quoting JUDITH HERMAN, M.D.,
TRAUMA AND RECOVERY 42 (2d ed. 1997)).
53.
Bossin & Demirdache, supra note 50, at 112.
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terror,' which in some individuals interferes with the ability to put feelings into words, leaving emotions to be mutely expressed by dysfunction
4
of the body."s All told, individuals suffering from PTSD may be among
the most fearful asylum applicants, yet they are acutely disadvantaged in
their ability to communicate that trepidation to decisionmakers. To the
extent that such persons are unable to communicate their trepidation,
faithful application of the subjective fear requirement would, of course,
result in denial of refugee status.
Recognizing the potential for exclusion, there is widespread agreement that persons suffering from PTSD and other forms of mental
disability should be deemed eligible for refugee status notwithstanding
their inability to satisfy the subjective fear requirement.ss The UNHCR
Handbook, for instance, instructs that in such cases "it may not be possible to attach the same importance as is normally attached to the
subjective element of 'fear,' which may be less reliable, and it may be
necessary to place greater emphasis on the objective situation."s6 In assessing claims of mentally disabled persons, courts have generally
attempted to adhere to this guidance. The Federal Court of Canada, for
instance, has held that "a person's mental condition at the time of a hearing should not normally be used against him to argue that he cannot
establish a subjective fear of persecution. . . . [I]t is the factual evidence
that must be relied upon to prove the qualifications for Convention refugee status."s7 Similarly, the English Court of Appeal endorsed a first
instance adjudicator's decision to attach "less weight to the subjective
element of fear of persecution ... but ... greater weight to the objective
element" in considering the claim of a mentally ill applicant.ss

54.
Id. at 112 (citing van der Kolk, supra note 51, at 193).
55.
See Raza v. Minister for Immigr. and Multicultural Aff., [2002] F.C.A. 350 (Full
Fed. Ct. 2002) (Austl.) ("[T]he Tribunal must first determine whether the applicant ... has the
requisite "well-founded fear" of persecution. This requires the Tribunal to be satisfied that
there is a subjective fear and an objective basis for it. Absent any subjective fear then (infants
and incapable persons apart) there can be no question whether there is a well-founded fear.")
(emphasis added); Minister for Immigr. and Multicultural Aff. v. Mohammed, [2000] F.C.A.
576 (Full Fed. Ct. 2000) (Austl.) (ruling that an applicant must hold the relevant fear except in
the case of an infant or mentally incapable person); See also UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note
4, 'II 207 (addressing analysis of the subjective element in cases where the applicant for refugee status is mentally disabled) and 'II 213 (discussing the challenges associated with
unaccompanied minors as relates to analysis of the subjective element).
56.
UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 4, 'II 211.
57.
Rosales v. Can. (Minister of Employment and Immigr.), [1993] 72 F.T.R. 1, 'II 14
(Fed. Ct. Trial Div. 1993) (Rothstein,
(Can.); see Canadian Immigration and Refugee
Board, Guideline 3: Child Refugee Claimants: Procedural and Evidentiary Issues (Sept. 30,
1996), available at http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/about/guidelines/child_e.htm.
58.
R. v. Sec'y of State for Home Dep't, Ex parte Ghaly, [1998] E.W.H.C. 621
(Adrnin.) (C.A. 1998) (Eng.).

n
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Yet it must be recognized that efforts of this kind do not completely
obviate concerns that a mentally disabled applicant facing a real risk of
being persecuted will be denied refugee status for failing to demonstrate
trepidation, despite his or her inability to communicate that trepidation.
In reality, it may well be next to impossible for decisionmakers consistently to distinguish mentally ill applicants (particularly those suffering
from PTSD) from applicants who are simply not fearful. 59 And to the
extent that PTSD goes unrecognized, a traumatized applicant is likely to
60
be found not fearful, and hence, ineligible for refugee status.
A second type of case that has caused problems for decisionmakers
attempting to undertake an inquiry into subjective fear is where the claim
to refugee status is made by younger children. To the extent that a child
is unable effectively to communicate his or her trepidation (or to connect
it to the relevant risk), a strict application of the bipartite test would, of
course, result in the denial of refugee status. As with mentally ill applicants, however, it is generally agreed that a child who lacks capacity to
satisfy the subjective prong of the two-part test should not be denied
refugee status for failing to demonstrate trepidation.
One strategy that allows decisionmakers to sidestep a child's
inability to communicate subjective fear is to impute parental fear to the
child. According to the UNHCR, "[i]f there is reason to believe that the
59.
While the diversity among asylum applicants makes it difficult for decisionmakers
to detect the presence of trepidation in healthy individuals, the same diversity poses even
greater challenges when the task is to determine whether or not a given applicant suffers from
PTSD. According to Carlson:
Although all of the core, secondary, and associated trauma symptoms can occur as
part of a post-traumatic disorder, all of these will not necessarily occur. Different
symptoms may predominate in a client's symptom picture as a result of the influence of various individual and situational factors and the length of time that has
passed since the trauma.
Bossin & Demirdache, supra note 50, at 111 (quoting EVE B. CARLSON, TRAUMA ASSESSMENTS: A CLINICIAN'S GUIDE 39 (1997)).
Not surprisingly, culture is a key factor complicating diagnosis of PTSD. Carlson notes:
As with all psychological disorders, we should expect culture to greatly influence
how symptoms are expressed. Although the bulk of research and clinical reports relating to trauma responses has focused on white, middle and upper-middle class
Americans, the research on trauma responses of persons from other cultures (and
U.S. subcultures) that is available indicates that there may be considerable variation
in the symptoms observed following trauma in different cultures.
Id.

To some extent, decisionmakers can rely on psychological or psychiatric reports to
60.
help inform their determination as to the existence of PTSD in a given applicant. But such
reports are expensive and not always available. Even where a psychological report is available,
an expert diagnosis of PTSD does not necessarily foreclose the possibility that a traumatized
applicant could be denied refugee status for lack of subjective fear.
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parents wish their child to be outside the country of origin on grounds of
well-founded fear of persecution, the child himself may be presumed to
61
have that fear." Where this is not an option, the UNHCR Handbook
recommends that "[w]here the minor has not reached a sufficient degree
of maturity to make it possible to establish well-founded fear in the same
way as for an adult, it may be necessary to have greater regard to certain
62
objective factors."
But who qualifies for this special treatment? By what method are
decisionmakers to determine which children have reached a sufficient
age of maturity that they should be required to establish a subjective fear
of being persecuted? UNHCR suggests that, in making this determination, courts should consider a child's age, level of education, and
63
understanding of need to tell the truth. But age and level of education
may not be accurate indicators of a child's capacity to express his or her
trepidation, especially in an alien environment and to a complete
stranger. Similarly, a child's willingness to tell the truth-while relevant
in other areas of law to the issue of whether a child has capacity to testify in court-seems to have very little to do with his or her capacity to
express trepidation. The absence of any principled method of determining which minors should be exempted from the subjective fear
requirement injects a degree of arbitrariness into the refugee status determination that is unacceptable given the extraordinary cost of error.
A third scenario in which decisionmakers have found the subjective
fear requirement too difficult to implement in practice occurs when systematic persecution of a specific group has resulted in a mass influx of
similarly situated persons. In such situations, authorities often cope with
the surge in asylum applications by prima facie group status determination. Under this approach, once the at-risk group is identified, the only
real requirements faced by individuals seeking recognition of refugee
status are to prove membership in the at-risk group, and that none of the
cessation or exclusion clauses is applicable. Assuming these requirements are met, refugee status is routinely recognized without any inquiry
whatsoever into whether or not the applicant is experiencing subjective
trepidation.
The magnitude of this exception calls into question whether there
can be said, in practice, to be any general requirement to show subjective
fear. In the developing world, where the majority of the world's refugees
are located, group status determinations are the norm rather than the ex61.
62.
63.

UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 4, 'II 218.

/d.'1!217.

BRIAN GORLICK, COMMON BURDENS AND STANDARDS: LEGAL ELEMENTS IN ASSESSING CLAIMS TO REFUGEE STATUS (UNHCR New Issues in Refugee Research, Working
Paper No. 68, Oct. 2002).
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ception. The UNHCR's Statistical Yearbook 2002 reveals that, between
1993 and 2002, 85% of Asia's total refugee population (3,553,305) was
64
granted refugee status on the basis of group status assessment. In East65
ern Europe, the figure was 93%. Indeed, the practice is so common in
Africa66 that Article 1(2) of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)
Convention specifically identifies affirmative group status recognition as
67
an alternative means of attaining Convention refugee status. Thus, in
68
what amounts to a majority of refugee status determinations worldwide,
69
subjective fear is simply not required.

64.
Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2002:
Trends in Displacement, Protection and Solutions (Bely Hovy ed. 2004), Statistical Annex II,
at 147, available at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/statistics.
Id. Statistical Annex II, at 167.
65.
66.
Between 1993 and 2002, for instance, 91 % of refugees were recognized on the
basis of prima facie group status determinations (3,027,639). See id. Statistical Annex II, at
166.
67.
Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, done
Sept. 10, 1969, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45 (entered into force June 20, 1974).
68.
Between 1993 and 2002, 68% of the world's refugees were recognized on the basis
of prima facie group status determinations (over seven million people all told). See UNHCR
Statistical Yearbook 2002, supra note 64, Statistical Annex II, at 145.
69.
The practice of group status recognition is widely perceived as a legitimate and
effective way to deal with major humanitarian crises, even in the minority of states which
operate formal status determination systems. The European Union Joint Position of 1996, for
instance, states that:
[e]ach application for asylum is examined on the basis of the facts and circumstances put forward in each individual case and taking account of the objective
situation prevailing in the country of origin. In practice it may be that a whole
group of people are exposed to persecution. In such cases, too, applications will be
examined individually, although in specific cases this examination 1nay be limited to
determining whether the individual belongs to the group in question.
Council of the European Union, Joint Position Defined by the Council on the Basis of Article
K.3 of the Treaty on European Union on the Harmonized Application of the Definition of the
Term "Refugee" in Article 1 of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 Relating to the Status
of Refugees, 'II 2, 1996 O.J. (L 63) 2, (emphasis added).
Thus, in the case of no.97-1627/F797, the Belgian Commission held that the applicant's
status as an ethnic Albanian was sufficient to establish a well-founded fear of being
persecuted. Case no. 97-1627/F797(Commission Permanente de Recours des Refugies, Apr.
14, 1999)(Belg.)("[D]ans le contexte qui prevaut actuellement au Kosovo, le seul fait
d'appartenir au groupe national albanais peut justifier une crainte raisonnable d'etre persecute
du fait de sa nationalite au sens de la Convention de Geneve."). In Switzerland, Hullmann
notes a comparable approach:
The measures taken against the Yizides in Turkey, as well as their intensity, involved persecution of the group that made it possible to say that 'every member of
this minority could expect to be persecuted at any time.' ... [S]imply belonging to
this group was evidence of having a well-founded fear of persecution ....
Klaus Hullmann, Switzerland, in WHO IS A REFUGEE? COMPARATIVE CASE LAW STUDY 128
(Jean-Yves Carlier et al. eds., 1997) (emphasis added).
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In sum, despite the widely held belief that trepidation is an essential
qualification for refugee status, decisionmakers are hard pressed
accurately and reliably to ascertain which applicants are, in fact,
subjectively fearful. In a variety of common situations, the practical
impediments involved in making a subjective fear determination are so
great that decisionmakers routinely dispense with the requirement and
grant refugee status solely on the basis of an applicant's actual risk of
being persecuted. All this begs the question: What does subjective fear
actually have to do with being a refugee? And if decisionmakers are
compelled by practical considerations to deviate from the standard with
such frequency that a majority of refugees worldwide are recognized
without insistence upon proof of subjective fear, 70 can it really be said
that trepidation is an essential element of "well-founded fear"?
Decisionmakers attempting to assess subjective fear, despite the inherent difficulties described above, have devised a host of artificial
mechanisms to aid in the determination. These coping strategies are born
of necessity. If subjective fear is truly an essential element of wellfounded fear, but is in reality next to impossible to detect on a reliable
basis simply by the assessment of oral evidence and demeanor, decisionmakers have little choice but to resort to more "objective" indicators
of subjective fearfulness.
a. Would a Reasonable Person be Fearful?
One way courts objectify the inquiry into subjective fear is by asking
whether a "reasonable person" would experience fear in the face of the
risk identified. According to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, "[a]n alien possesses a well-founded fear of persecution if a
reasonable person in her circumstances would fear persecution if she
11
were to be returned to her native country." This formulation has been
adopted by the U.S. Board of Immigration Appeals 72 and, at least tacitly,
70.
It could be argued that the prevalence of group status determination is dictated
simply by the practical imperatives associated with humanitarian crises and mass migration
flows that cannot be managed any other way. It might therefore be said that determinations
relying exclusively on group affiliation to establish a well-founded fear either represent mere
exceptions to the general norm (requiring trepidation) or that, in such determinations, trepidation is simply assumed from the fact of the applicant's membership in an at-risk group. In
response to these hypotheses, however, it is worth noting that judgments based on group status
determinations seldom make note of the fact that they are effectively bypassing an "essential"
element for recognition of refugee status. If subjective fear were truly thought to be an essential qualification for recognition of refugee status, it is surprising that there would not be at
least some acknowledgment that an exception is being made, or at least that the existence of
trepidation is assumed. The absence of such references is more consistent with an approach
that does not regard trepidation as an essential element.
71.
Guevara v. INS, 786 F.2d 1242, 1249 (5th Cir. 1986) (Brown, J.).
72.
Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 445 (BJ.A. 1987).
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73

approved by the U.S. Supreme Court. As Anker observes, this approach
to some extent obviates the worst risks associated with the duty to show
subjective fear:
If properly understood and applied, the Board's formulation "a
reasonable person in the circumstances of the [applicant]" can
reconcile the concerns [that it raises]. The subjective and objective elements should not be sharply dichotomized; rather, the
subjectivity of the standard means that the applicant's perspective, or that of a reasonable person in her circumstances is the
lens through which the adjudicator must evaluate the reasonableness of her flight. 74

But in truth, the reasonable person inquiry dispenses with a requirement of subjective fear altogether. To satisfy the subjective element
under this approach, the applicant need only establish an objective risk
of being persecuted of a kind that would engender fear in a "reasonable
person"-his or her own fear, or lack thereof, is completely irrelevant.
b. Inferences from Pre-Application Conduct
Other decisionmakers have objectified the inquiry in ways that seem
more genuinely calculated to ascertain whether the applicant is actually
fearful. A common strategy involves examining a person's preapplication conduct for indications of fear. Where the applicant has behaved in a way that seems inconsistent with the presence of fear, at least
in the opinion of the decisionmaker, the subjective element is deemed
not satisfied, and refugee status is denied. Regrettably, however, the
mechanisms employed in practice often have no logical correlation to
the existence of fear.
For example, some courts have inferred a lack of fear from an applicant's delay in claiming refugee status. 75 The Federal Court of Canada
explained that "delay points to a lack of subjective fear of persecution,
the reasoning being that someone who was truly fearful would claim

73.
INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104 n.9 (1988) (Stevens, J.) (citing the reasonable person formulation from both the Mogharrabi and the Guevara Flores opinions, but stating, "We
express no opinion on ... [that] formulation.").
DEBORAH E. ANKER, THE LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 27 (1999).
74.
75.
Re Minister for Immigr. and Multicultural Aff., Ex parte PT, 178 A.L.R. 497 (Aust!.
2001); Cruz v. Can. (Minister of Employment and lmmigr.) IMM 3848-93 (Fed. Ct. Trial Div.
1994) (Simpson, J.) (Can.) cited in Dcruze v. Can. (Minister of Citizenship and Immigr.)
[1999] 171 F.T.R. 76 (Fed. Ct. Trial Div. 1999) (Can.); Castillejos v. Can. (Minister of Citizenship and Immigr.), IMM 1950--94 (Fed. Ct. Trial Div. 1994) (Cullent, J.) (Can.); Kamana v.
Can. (Minister of Citizenship and Immigr.), IMM 5998-98 (Fed. Ct. Trial Div. 1999)
(Tremblay-Lamar, J.) (Can.).
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refugee status at the first opportunity." Similarly, the High Court of
Australia has held that significant delays can negate a finding of subjective fearfulness. 77 Yet, it is difficult to discern how evidence of delay
logically relates to the presence or absence of subjective fear. In fact,
applicants who delay claiming refugee status may actually be more fearful than those who make their claim immediately. Aware of the severe
consequences if status is not recognized, it seems completely plausible
that genuinely fearful persons might postpone making a claim until they
have learned something about the country's status determination system,
retained counsel, or otherwise sought to minimize their risk of rejection.
Indeed, the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board held.in one case
that the applicant's "delay in claiming refugee status added to the alleged
subjective fear, since the claimant feared being returned to France with
78
the children."
A second means by which courts sometimes rely on pre-application
conduct to objectify the inquiry into subjective fear is to equate the applicant's failure to claim asylum in an intermediate country with a lack
79
of fearfulness. In the English case of JS, an Indian applicant's route to
England included a four month stay in Moscow, fifteen to twenty days in
80
an unknown country, and travel through other countries by train. The
English Court of Appeal upheld the denial of refugee status on grounds
that the applicant's failure to claim asylum in any of the intermediate
countries "ill accord[ed] with his claim to have fled India for fear of his
life."81 Similarly, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit recently
ruled that a Colombian applicant's failure to claim asylum in any of the
three countries he visitecJ on a business trip before coming to America
82
"undermined his claim that he genuinely feared persecution at home,"
leading to the denial of refugee status. In a slightly more nuanced examination, some courts afford the applicant an opportunity to explain
why he or she did not claim asylum in intermediate countries. The underlying presumption, however, is that only a particularly persuasive

76.
Castillejos v. Can. (Minister of Citizenship and Immigr.), IMM 1950-94 (Fed. Ct.
Trial Div. 1994) (Cullen, J.) (Can.).
77.
Re Minister for Immigr. and Multicultural Aff., Ex parte Pf, 178 A.L.R. 497 (Aust!.
2001).
78.
CRDD No. M99-07094 (Immigr. and Refugee Bd., May 31, 2001) (Can.).
79.
See, e.g., Case Abstract /JRU0032, 2 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 138 (1990); JS v. Sec'y
of State for the Home Dep't, [1996) E.W.C.A. Civ. 832 (C.A. 1996) (Eng.); Pelaez v. INS,
2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 10305 (!st Cir. May 22, 2003).
80.
JS v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [1996) E.W.C.A. Civ. 832 (C.A. 1996)
(Eng.).
Id. (Pill, L.J.).
81.
82.
Pelaez, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 10305, at *8 (Lipez, J.).
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explanation can rebut the usual inference that delay is indicative of a
84
lack of subjective fear.
Yet it is not immediately evident why an applicant's decision not to
claim asylum in an intermediate country necessarily correlates to the
absence of subjective fear. Presence of family members, employment
possibilities, religious toleration, and ethnic affiliations are just a few
reasons why an asylum seeker might choose to stay in one country for a
85
time before moving on to another. Indeed, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit recently acknowledged that it would be quite legitimate for an individual from the Abkhaz region of Georgia to pass
through Russia without claiming refugee status in view of his inability
legally to secure work there. More generally, the court rejected the logic
of any presumption that genuine refugees should seek protection in the
first country in which they arrive:
[A] refugee need not seek asylum in the first place where hearrives. . . . Rather, it is "quite reasonable" for an individual
fleeing persecution "to seek a new homeland that is insulated
from the instability [of his home country] and that offers more
promising economic opportunity" ... [We have previously held
that] "[w]e do not find it inconsistent with a claimed fear of persecution that a refugee after he flees his homeland, goes to the
86
country where he believes his opportunities will be best."
In any event, the bipartite approach is purportedly concerned with
the applicant's fear of being persecuted in her country of origin. An applicant's prolonged stay in an intermediate country might (at most)
indicate a lack of fear with respect to conditions in that country. A less
83.
Among the factors recognized by most courts as adequate explanations for a failure
to claim protection in an intermediate country are the lack of impending harm at the time of
the stay there; a desire to distance oneself from the risk of incursion by the agent of persecution; and concerns regarding the commitment and ability of the intermediate country to
provide truly adequate and durable protection. Some courts are more generous in their approach, recognizing also such concerns as the desire to make a claim in a country where one
speaks the language, or where friends or family are present. See generally HATHAWAY, supra
note 7, at 46-50.
See, e.g., R. v. Immigr. App. Trib., Ex parte Parra, [2000] E.W.H.C. 377 (Admin.)
84.
(Q.B. 2000) (Eng.); Owusu-Ansah v. Can. (Minister of Employment and Immigr.), 8 Imm.
L.R. (2d) I06 (Fed. Ct. App. 1989) (Can.); Z. v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2002] 1.E.S.C. 12, 'lI 60 (Ir. S.C. 2002).
85.
See, e.g., Owusu-Ansah v. Can. (Minister of Employment and Immigr.), [1989] 8
Imm. L.R. (2d) 106 (Fed. Ct. App. 1989) (Can.) (finding that the Ghanaian claimant's failure
to claim refugee status in intermediate states was reasonable in view of his desire to put a
substantial distance between himself and his persecutors, to make his claim in a country with a
sound human rights record, and to live in an English-speaking country); See also HATHAWAY,
supra note 7, at 46-50.
86.
Melkonian v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 1061, 1071 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).
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lengthy stay would not signify even that much. In neither instance would
the applicant's failure to claim refugee status in the intermediate state be
necessarily indicative of his or her level of fear with respect to persecution in the country of origin.
A third way that courts sometimes use evidence of pre-application
conduct to negate a finding of subjective fear is by inferring a lack of
fear from the applicant's delay in fleeing the country of origin. 87 In the
Australian case of Gomez, 88 for example, the first instance decisionmaker
denied asylum to a Sri Lankan family based on evidence that they delayed departure for twelve days after receiving visas to enter Australia,
noting that "[h]ad [the family] indeed been in fear for their lives, I consider that they would have left Sri Lanka as soon as they could, by any
means they could." The Australian Federal Court endorsed this method
of analysis, finding twelve days "an unusually long delay" after receiv89
ing travel visas.
In truth, however, while evidence of delayed flight may be probative
of an applicant's lack of fear, even truly fearful applicants are not always
able to depart their country of origin at the earliest possible moment. The
applicant may have been in hiding or under the surveillance of his or her
90
91
persecutors. She may have been sick or injured. She may have had
family to tend to, or otherwise been trapped by circumstances that rendered departure physically or psychologically difficult. 92 Each of these
circumstances could naturally delay the applicant's flight without signaling an absence of fear.
A fourth strategy is to infer a lack of fearfulness from evidence that
the applicant engaged in preflight conduct which increased his of her

87.
See Gomez v. Minister for Immigr. and Multicultural Aff., [2002] F.C.A. 480 (Fed.
Ct. 2002) (Aust!.); Mejia v. Can. (Minister of Citizenship and Immigr.), IMM 104{}-95 (Fed.
Ct. Trial Div. 1996) (Can.); Singh v. Can. (Minister of Citizenship and Imrnigr.), 160 F.T.R.
288 (Fed. Ct. Trial Div. 1998) (Can.); Farahmandpour v. Can. (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigr.), IMM 92-97 (Fed. Ct. Trial Div. 1997) (Can.).
88.
Gomez v. Minister for Immigr. and Multicultural Aff., [2002] F.C.A. 480 (Fed. Ct.
2002) (Aust!.).
89.
Id.
90.
See Mejia v. Can. (Minister of Citizenship and Immigr.), IMM 104{}-95 (Fed. Ct.
Trial Div. 1996) (Can.) (excusing the applicant's delay on grounds that she was in hiding prior
to her departure).
91.
See Farahmandpour v. Can. (Minister of Citizenship and Immigr.), IMM 92-97
(Fed. Ct. Trial Div. 1997) (Can.) (finding that applicant's delay was caused by her poor
health).
92.
See Cazak v. Can. (Minister of Citizenship and Immigr.), IMM 1110-01 (Fed. Ct.
Trial Div. 2002) (Can.) (where the tribunal denied refugee status because applicant did not
leave the country immediately after being beaten by husband and receiving threats against her
family but, on appeal, the Federal Court found delay was justified based on the psychology
and dependence of those subject to domestic violence).
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risk of being persecuted. In the American case of Singh v. Moschorak,
for instance, the applicant was an Indian national of the Sikh faith who,
prior to claiming asylum, had worked for the All India Sikh Student
Federation. The applicant claimed to have been detained and beaten by
the Indian police on multiple occasions as a result of his affiliation with
the group. The first instance decisionmaker rejected Singh's application
on the assumption that a truly fearful person would have discontinued
his involvement with the Student Federation after the first incidents of
persecution. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, noting that the
immigration judge had failed "to distinguish fortitude in the face of dan94
ger from absence of fear."
Indeed, one might well ask whether it is even possible to distinguish
"fortitude" from "absence of fear." In any case, it is clear that an applicant does not lack subjective fear merely because he or she has risked
hardship in furtherance of a social or political cause. More fundamentally, the denial of refugee status based on this misconception seems
difficult to reconcile with the basic goals of refugee law. As GrahlMadsen observed, "The Convention seeks to protect persons who would
be subject to political persecution through no fault of their own. In this
connection the struggle for certain political conviction is not to be re95
garded as a fault but as a right founded in the Law of Nature."
A fifth way that courts sometimes use inferences from preapplication conduct to negate a finding of subjective fear is by treating
any return travel by an applicant to the country of origin as evidence that
91
he or she does not fear being persecuted there. 96 In Maqdassy, for example, the Canadian Federal Court Trial Division considered the case of
an Iraqi applicant who had once returned home in order to sell her house.
Finding that the applicant's reasons for returning to Iraq were insufficiently "pressing," the court found her to lack subjective fear, and
therefore denied refugee status.
Yet while evidence of return may have some logical correlation to
the presence of fear, it cannot be said that fearful applicants never travel
to their country of origin. The decision to return to a situation of great
peril may be dictated by the necessity of tending to sick or dying
93.
Singh v. Moschorak, 53 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 1995).
94.
Id. at 1034.
95.
GRAHL-MADSEN, supra 8, at 223.
96.
See, e.g., Thuraisamy v. Minister for Immigr. and Multicultural Aff., [1999) F.C.A.
1632 (Full Fed. Ct. 1999) (Austl.); Maqdassy v. Can. (Minister of Citizenship and Immigr.),
[2002] F.C.T. 182 (Fed. Ct. Trial Div. 2002) (Can.); Caballero v. Can. (Minister of Employment and Immigr.), No. A-266-91 (Fed. Ct. App. 1993) (Can.).
97.
Maqdassy v. Can. (Minister of Citizenship and Immigr.), [2002] F.C.T. 182 (Fed.
Ct. Trial Div. 2002) (Can.).
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relatives. Indeed, as in Maqdassy, even a truly fearful applicant may be
compelled by financial necessity to travel to her country of origin. There
is a wide variety of personal emergencies that could lead even acutely
fearful applicants to risk persecution by traveling to their homeland. As
such, it would be unwise to hold that evidence of return may routinely be
assumed to indicate whether a given applicant fears the possibility of
being persecuted.
The practice of denying refugee status based on evidence of return
also raises legal concerns. The legal significance of return is expressly
addressed by Article l(C)(4) of the Convention, which contemplates cessation of refugee status not as the result of return but only upon the
99
applicant's re-establishment in his or her country of origin. Under generally accepted understandings of the re-establishment criteria, an
individual does not forfeit refugee status unless he or she returns to the
country of origin "with a view to permanently resid[e] there," and not
simply for a "temporary visit." 100 While, strictly speaking, Article l(C) of
the Convention applies to a person who has already been recognized as a
refugee, it would be extraordinary for an act insufficient to justify cessation of refugee status nonetheless to be deemed a proper basis to deny
101
refugee status in the first place.
Despite all of the concerns raised in this article regarding the risks of
surrogate indicators of subjective fear, proponents of the subjective element might nonetheless reply that even if the subjective fear requirement
were to be eliminated, decisionmakers would continue to rely upon the
sorts of mechanisms described above to deny refugee status. Rather than
treating such evidence as probative of a lack of fearfulness, they would
simply rely upon it to determine that an applicant is not actually at risk
98.
Indeed, in another Canadian case the Federal Court of Appeal overturned a first
instance decision to deny refugee status because the applicant's return to Sri Lanka to care for
her sick mother showed that she was not fearful. Shanmugarajah v. Can. (Minister of Employment and Immigr.), No. A-609-91 (Fed. Ct. App. 1992) (Can.).
99.
Refugee Convention, supra note 2, art. l(C)(4) ("This Convention shall cease to
apply to any person falling under the terms of section A if . . . [h]e has voluntarily reestablished himself in the country which he left or outside which he remained owing to fear of
persecution."). The original draft of this clause, which would have revoked the refugee status
of any person who "returns to his country of former nationality," was rejected by the Ad Hoc
Committee on the ground that it might bar persons who had been forcibly repatriated to their
state of origin, as well as those who had chosen to return to their country of origin only temporarily. See, e.g., U.N. ESCOR, Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems,
Statement of the Director of the International Refugee Organization, at 2, U.N. Doc.
E/AC.32/L.4 (1950).
100.
UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 4, CJ[ 134.
101.
This is doubly true in light of the long delays involved in processing asylum claims.
Particularly where an applicant has long awaited a determination of refugee status, decisionmakers undermine the strictures of the cessation clause by using evidence of return as part of a
less constrained subjective fear analysis.
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of being persecuted. In other words, an adverse finding as to subjective
fear under the current bipartite approach would simply be replaced by an
identically grounded finding that there is not a real chance of being persecuted in the country of origin. As such, elimination of a subjective fear
requirement would make little practical difference to the outcome of a
case.
The flaw in this reasoning is not that the various concerns presently
relied upon as objective indicators of subjective fear-evidence of delay
in flight, of failure to claim protection in an intermediate country or at
least immediately upon arrival in the asylum state, of voluntary assumption of risk in the home state, or of return to the country of origin-are
never relevant to the assessment of actual risk. To the contrary, when
considered only as part of the assessment of actual risk, these factors are
weighed together with all other evidence of risk. But when these factors
are considered in order to determine whether the applicant meets a separate and distinct subjective fear requirement, they may lead in and of
themselves to a rejection of the claim without any examination of risk.
This is because under the bipartite approach, the absence of subjective
fear as borne out by one of these surrogate indicators leads automatically
to denial of the claim.
c. Treating Credibility as Fearfulness
The most complete capitulation to the difficulties of assessing fear is
the growing practice of equating any lack of credibility with absence of
subjective fear, and hence, with disqualification from refugee status. Under this approach, an applicant deemed credible is assumed to be
fearful. 102 But an applicant found not to be credible in relation to any
matter is deemed to lack subjective fear, and hence, not entitled to rec103
ognition of refugee status.
102.
See Ward v. Attorney General, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 'l! 54 (Can. 1993) (La Forest, J.)
("The Board here found Ward to be credible in his testimony, thus establishing the subjective
branch."); Maximilok v. Can. (Minister of Citizenship and Immigr.), [1998] F.T.R. 461, 'l! 17
(Fed. Ct. Trial Div. 1998) (Joyal, J.) (Can.) ("The subjective basis for the fear of persecution
rests solely on the credibility of the applicants."); Mario v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't,
(Immigr. App. Trib. 1998) (U.K.) (UNHCR Retworld 2004 CD-ROM, issue 13) ("We find as
a fact (a) that it is reasonably likely that the core of what [the applicant] described in his evidence happened; and (b) that in consequence it is reasonably likely that he has a subjective
fear of persecution."); Mgoian v. INS, 184 F.3d 1029, 1035 (9th Cir. 1999) ("An alien satisfies
the subjective component by credibly testifying that she genuinely fears persecution.");
Abankwah v. INS, 185 F.3d 18, 22 (2d Cir. 1999) (Sweet, J.) ("The subjective component may
be satisfied by the applicant's credible testimony that she fears persecution."); CarranzaHemandez v. INS, 12 F.3d 4 (2nd Cir. 1993).
See, e.g., Duarte v. Can. (Minister of Citizenship and Immigr.) 2003 F.C. 988, 'll 15
103.
(Fed. Ct. 2003) (Kelen, J.) (Can.) ("[T]he Refugee Division did not err in considering delay as
a factor in assessing the applicant's credibility with respect to her claim of a subjective fear of
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For example, it is common practice in the United States to invoke
inconsistencies in an applicant's statements to find him or her not to be
credible, therefore necessarily lacking subjective fear, and consequently
104
di sentitled to protection. In Ramsameachire, 105 a Sri Lankan applicant
of the Tamil ethnic group based his asylum claim on evidence of widespread persecution of Tamils by governmental authorities. 106 The
immigration judge held, however, that inconsistencies between the applicant's testimony at the asylum hearing and his statements at the initial
airport interview indicated a lack of credibility, and hence, a lack of
trepidation. He was, therefore, denied refugee status without any account
being taken of evidence of widespread persecution of Tamils. 101 On appeal, the applicant argued that the first level decisionmaker was obliged
to consider his evidence of risk, despite the adverse credibility determination. Both the BIA and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed.
Judge Sotomayor of the Second Circuit stated:
Ramsameachire's argument overlooks the fact that, in order to
establish his eligibility for asylum, he had to demonstrate both
that he subjectively feared future persecution and that his fear
was objectively reasonable. Although his pattern or practice evidence was relevant to the objective reasonableness of his fear of
persecution, the BIA's adverse credibility determination precluded him from establishing the subjective prong of the wellfounded fear standard. The BIA was therefore justified in not
considering Ramsameachire's proffered evidence of widespread

persecution if forced to return to Cuba."); Emiantor v. Minister for lmmigr. and Multicultural
Aff., (1998) F.C.A. 1186 (Full Fed. Ct., 1998) (per curiam) (Aust!.) ("Because [the Tribunal]
did not believe [the applicants'] evidence about their Convention-based claim, it must have
concluded that they did not have a Convention-based subjective fear."); Chudinov v. Can.
(MinisterofCitizenship and lmmigr.), IMM 2419-97, 'I! 19 (Fed. Ct. Trial Div. 1998) (Can.).
104.
See, e.g., Valderrama v. INS, 260 F.3d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Because we
hold that substantial evidence supports the BIA's denial of asylum on the basis of its adverse
credibility finding [based on discrepancies between the applicant's first and second petitions],
we do not reach the issue whether the record supports the BIA's finding that [the petitioner]
also lacks an objective, well-founded fear of persecution."); Berroteran-Melendez v. INS, 955
F.2d 1251, 1257-58 (9th Cir. 1991) (affirming lower court ruling that "because [petitioner]
failed to present 'candid, credible and sincere testimony' demonstrating genuine fear of persecution, he failed to satisfy the subjective component of the well-founded fear standard")
(citations omitted). But see Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 476 (3d. Cir. 2003) (cautioning
against placing too much weight on inconsistencies between an asylum affidavit and subsequent testimony); Al-Harbi v. INS, 242 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that applicant must
be fearful in light of strong evidence of risk, despite some inconsistencies in his testimony).
105.
Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169 (2nd Cir. 2004).
106.
Id.
107.
Id.
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persecution of Tamils before rejecting his asylum application
108
(emphasis added).
Yet the premise that applicants found not to be credible necessarily
lack subjective fear is fundamentally illogical, as it erroneously assumes
that fearful applicants do not lie or exaggerate in the course of relating
their story. This assumption defies common sense. As the Australian
Federal Court correctly observed, "[G]enuine refugees are often at a dire
disadvantage as to their capacity to bring their cases and are ... 'engaged in an often desperate battle for freedom, if not life itself.'
Exaggeration and lies are accordingly to be expected from some of
109
them." Out of desperation to avoid being returned to a situation of risk,
110
even truly fearful applicants may lie and exaggerate. Thus, some applicants found to lack credibility may in fact be subjectively fearful.
Moreover, the equation of non-credibility with an absence of trepidation, and hence, with disentitlement to refugee status, is fundamentally at
odds with the generally accepted view that credibility is not a per se re111
quirement for refugee status. This point was clearly made by the Full
Federal Court of Australia in Perchine:
[T]here will be some cases where, although an applicant is disbelieved, or indeed the Tribunal might be positively satisfied on
the balance of probabilities that the applicant's account of events
did not occur, nevertheless an inquiry ought to be made as to
whether there is a real and substantial possibility that something
like what the applicant is saying, may have occurred in his or her
case. A positive conclusion on that question may bear on the
112
conclusion as to whether there is a real chance of persecution.

l 08.
Id. at 183.
109.
Kalala v. Minister for Immigr. and Multicultural Aff., [2001] F.C.A. 1594, 'J[ 3 (Full
Fed. Ct. 2001) (Aust!.) (applying the reasoning in Re Minister for Immigr. and Multicultural
Aff. of the Commonwealth of Australia, Ex parte Abebe, [1999] 162 A.L.R. l (Aust!. 1999)).
110.
Minister for Immigr. and Multicultural Aff. v. Rajalingam, [1999] EC.A. 719, 'J[ 83
(Fed. Ct. 1999) (Sackville, J.) (Aust!.). The tribunal found the applicant to be lacking in credibility, and thus found no subjective fear and denied asylum. The Federal Court overruled,
questioning whether credibility should play any role in the decision and sympathizing with the
willingness of the applicant's grandmother to "do anything to improve her granddaughter's
life chances, including, if necessary, exaggerating or fabricating events." Id.
111.
See, e.g., Lai v. Can. (Minister of Employment and Immigr.), 8 Imm. L.R. (2d) 245,
'Jl 3 (Fed. Ct. App. 1989) (Marceau, J.A.) (Can.) ("Having looked at the Applicant's testimony
and found that part of it was not quite credible, [the court of first instance] concluded that the
subjective element was lacking, thus bringing the matter to an end. This was not a proper
approach.").
112.
Perchine v. Minister for Immigr. and Multicultural Aff., [2001] EC.A. 1254, 'll 8
(Full Fed. Ct. 2001) (Aust!.).

534

Michigan Journal of International Law

[Vol. 26:505

While the testimony of a non-credible applicant cannot be relied
upon to establish an actual risk of being persecuted, the required evidence of risk frequently exists separately, and apart from, the applicant's
testimony. In such cases, there is a clear legal duty to recognize refugee
113
status. But when evidence of non-credibility is relied upon to dismiss a
claim for absence of subjective fear, there is no opportunity even to consider other evidence of actual risk.
All told, the various mechanisms designed artificially to validate
subjective fear are, at best, unreliable, and at worst violate established
protection principles.
B. Fear to Supplement an Objectively Weak Claim
While the bipartite understanding of "well-founded fear" is predominant in contemporary practice, some present support exists as well
for the view that evidence of intense trepidation, while not an essential
element, may (where present) be used to supplement weak evidence of
actual risk. This entirely different form of subjective element is, in essence, a "top-up" mechanism in that it allows refugee status to be
recognized, at least in extreme cases, despite evidence of risk that would
otherwise be insufficient.
The UNHCR Handbook seems to endorse this use of a subjective
element. At paragraph 41, it instructs that "[f]ear must be reasonable.
Exaggerated fear, however, may be well-founded if, in all the circum114
stances of the case, such a state of mind can be regarded as justified."
In other words, evidence of extreme trepidation ("exaggerated fear") that
is understandable in light of an applicant's background and the surrounding circumstances is a factor capable of overcoming an insufficiency of
actual risk. At paragraph 42, the UNHCR Handbook seems to use the
notion of "intolerability" as a short-hand for extreme trepidation: "[T]he
applicant's fear should be considered well-founded if he can establish, to
a reasonable degree, that his continued stay in his country of origin has
become intolerable to him for the reasons stated in the definition, or
would for the same reasons be intolerable if he returned there." 115
Despite the obvious appeal of this understanding from the perspective of refugees and their advocates, reliance on evidence of subjective
trepidation as a "plus factor" may be quite unfair, as it results in the disparate treatment of applicants identically situated with respect to their
113.
See Attakora v. Can. (Minister of Employment and Immigr.), A-1091-87, 'lI 13 (Fed.
Ct. App. 1989) (Hugessen, J.) (Can.) ("Whether or not the applicant was a credible witness ...
does not prevent him from being a refugee if his political opinions and activities are likely to
lead to his arrest and punishment.").
114.
UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 4, 'lI 41.
115.
Id. 'lI 42.
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actual risk of being persecuted. Whenever subjective fear is thought relevant to the assessment of refugee status, persons who are more timid or
demonstrative, or who are simply more able to articulate their trepidation
in ways recognizable as such by decisionrnakers, are advantaged relative
to others who face the same level of actual risk, but who are more courageous, more reserved, or whose expressions of trepidation are not
identified as such. The result is that applicants viewed by decisionrnakers
as fearful may be granted refugee status, whereas applicants facing identical risks of being persecuted, but who are deemed not to be sufficiently
fearful, may be denied protection. Disparate treatment of identically situated claimants based solely on a decisionrnaker's impressions regarding
the presence or absence of fear is difficult to square with refugee law's
fundamental goal of providing surrogate protection to persons who are
. k .116
tru1y at ns

II.

"FEAR" AS FORWARD-LOOKING EXPECTATION OF RISK

We earlier observed that there are two linguistically plausible interpretations of "fear." 111 Although the term may signify an emotional
reaction of trepidation on the part of the applicant for refugee status,
"fear" can equally refer to his or her forward-looking expectation of risk.
We argue here that in view of the duty to interpret a treaty based not
solely on text, but also to take account of its context, object, and purpose, 118 the latter understanding of "fear" as forward-looking expectation
of risk is more legally authentic. This understanding of "fear" as mandating only an anticipatory appraisal of risk is moreover fully consistent
with a second principle of treaty interpretation, namely that equal attention must be given to all legally authoritative versions of the treaty.
Therefore, in the context of the Refugee Convention, equal attention
must be given to the French language version of the treaty and to the
general practice of courts interpreting "craignant avec raison" (the
French language counterpart to "well-founded fear") not to make substantive use of trepidation in assessing "well-founded fear." Finally, a
treaty should be interpreted to the extent possible in a way that avoids
internal inconsistency. In the case of the Refugee Convention, this means
reconciling the approach to "well-founded fear" with Articles l(C)(5-6),
116.
See infra Part II.A.
See supra pp. 506-508.
117.
118.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 3, 1969, art.
31(1), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 81.L.M. 679 ("A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in
light of its object and purpose.")[hereinafter Vienna Convention].
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which authorize the cessation of refugee status without regard to an applicant's mental state, and with the clear concern of Article 33's duty of
non-refoulement to ensure that refugees are not exposed to the actual risk
of harm.
A. Taking Account of the Convention's Object and Purpose

The Refugee Convention was designed to provide surrogate protection to persons at risk of being persecuted in their country of origin for
one of the five enumerated reasons, and only to such persons. As the Supreme Court of Canada held in Ward:
The international community was meant to be a forum of second
resort for the persecuted, a "surrogate", approachable upon failure of local protection. The rationale upon which international
refugee law rests is not simply the need to give shelter to those
persecuted by the state, but, more widely, to provide refuge to
those whose home state cannot or does not afford them protec. f rom persecution.
. 119
t10n
In Horvath, the House of Lords similarly adopted the view that
"[t]he general purpose of the Convention is to enable the person who no
longer has the benefit of protection against persecution for a Convention
reason in his own country to tum for protection to the international
community." 120
Given the Convention's risk-oriented focus, it would be anomalous
indeed to ascribe to "fear" a meaning that encourages states to distinguish between applicants identically situated with respect to risk, and
solely on the basis of individual temperament. Yet when subjective fear
is deemed an essential qualification for refugee status, and even when it
is used as a "plus factor," the result is to advantage the claims of applicants whose trepidation can be readily identified by decisionmakers and
to disadvantage individuals who, for whatever reason, do not project
fearfulness. The disparate treatment of applicants identically situated
with respect to their actual risk of being persecuted is difficult to square
with the human rights-based goals of refugee law. As the Australian
Federal Court eloquently explained:
The Convention aims at the protection of those whose human
dignity is imperiled, the timorous as well as the bold, the inarticulate as well as the outspoken, the followers as well as the
119.
Ward v. Attorney General, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 'II 40 (Can. 1993) (La Forest, J.).
120.
Horvath v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, (2000] 3 All E.R. 577, 581 (H.L.
2000) (U.K.).
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leaders in religious, political, or social causes, in a word, the or121
dinary person as well as the extraordinary one.
The United Kingdom Immigration Appeal Tribunal has similarly observed that "[i]t may be inadvisable to place too much weight upon the
subjective element ... in order to avoid different treatment of persons
similarly placed, and in order to avoid penalizing the courageous." 122
Our concern is that the bipartite understanding of "well-founded
fear" requires that an applicant who either is not fearful, or whose fear is
not identified as such, be denied refugee status; yet an identically situated applicant who appears from a decisionmaker's standpoint to look
fearful is to be found eligible for international protection. Even assuming
that decisionmakers are able reliably and accurately to identify trepida23
tion (an assumption earlier refuted at length)/ this result cannot be
reconciled to the object of the Refugee Convention. As the Canadian
Federal Court of Appeal has noted, "the definition of a refugee is certainly not designed to exclude brave or simply stupid persons in favor of
124
those who are more timid or more intelligent."
Though clearly less problematic from a protection standpoint, the
view that evidence of trepidation is appropriately used to supplement an
otherwise weak case also runs afoul of the Convention's object and
purpose. In Chan, the High Court of Australia observed that "the object
of the Convention is not to relieve fears which are all in the mind,
however understandable, but to facilitate refuge for those who are in
125
need of it." While there may be compelling reasons for wanting to be
generous to intensely fearful persons who do not face a genuine risk of
being persecuted in their country of origin, the Refugee Convention was
not intended as an all-encompassing source of humanitarian relief. 126

121.
Win v. Minister for Immigr. and Multicultural Aff., [2001] EC.A. 132, 'Il 20 (Full
Fed. Ct. 2001) (Madgwick, J.) (Aust!.).
122.
See Ali v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, No. 17300, HX 62265/96, (lmmigr.
App. Trib. 1998) (U.K.).
123.
See supra Part l.A.2 for a detailed discussion of the inherent difficulties associated
with determining whether an applicant is or is not fearful.
124.
Yusuf v. Can. (Minister of Employment and Irnmigr.), [1991] l F.C. 629, 'Il 5 (Fed.
Ct. App. 1992) (Hugessen, J.) (Can.); see also HATHAWAY, supra note 7, at 69 ("[l]t would be
anomalous to define international legal obligations in such a way that persons facing the same
harm would receive differential protection."); DAVID JACKSON, IMMIGRATION: LAW AND PRACTICE 447 (1999) ("An applicant should not be banned from refugee status because of his
bravery or foolhardiness, nor should he receive an advantage for timidity.").
125.
Chan v. Minister for Immigr. and Ethnic Aff., [1989] 169 C.L.R. 379, 397 (Aust!.
1989).
126.
Butler v. Att'y Gen'!, [1999] N.Z.A.R. 205 (C.A. 1997) (N.Z.) ("The test [for recognition of refugee status] is for instance sharply different from the humanitarian tests
provided for in the Immigration Act. ... It does not in particular range widely over the rights
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States are, of course, free to act in ways that go beyond the requirements
of the Refugee Convention, but only persons who truly face the risk of
being persecuted are eligible for Convention refugee status.
In short, the object and purpose of the Convention as adumbrated by
senior courts strongly support an interpretation of "fear" that emphasizes
its anticipatory rather than emotive qualities. The substantive consideration of subjective fear as part of the "well-founded fear" inquiry is
inconsistent with established protection principles, and is otherwise out of
keeping with the goals of refugee law. In contrast, the risk-oriented understanding of "fear" as forward-looking expectation, and as mandating only
a prospective appraisal of an applicant's risk, is very much in harmony
with the Convention's central goals.

B. "Craignant avec raison . ... "
Dominant practice under the equally authoritative French language
121
version of the Refugee Convention also supports the view that the
well-founded fear requirement neither conditions access to refugee status
on a showing of trepidation, nor allows evidence of trepidation (where
present) to override otherwise insufficient evidence of actual risk. The
"well-founded fear" requirement is articulated in the French language
text as "craignant avec raison." 128 Like its English language counterpart,
the French verb "craindre" may be understood either in the sense of
129
trepidation, or to signal forward-looking expectation. While either is a
linguistically plausible interpretation, practice in Francophone states
more commonly conforms to the latter meaning. Courts applying "craignant avec raison" do not require a demonstration of trepidation; indeed,
the test for "craignant avec raison" generally does not seem to require
any consideration at all of the applicant's subjective state of mind.
In France, for example, the inquiry into well-founded fear seems
singularly focused on the applicant's risk of being persecuted. In the recent jurisprudence, there have been no decisions that deny status for lack
of subjective fear. When courts find the evidence of risk compelling,
refugee status is routinely recognized without an inquiry into the applicant's emotional state, 130 even where the applicant's behavior might have
and interests in respect of the family: the refugee inquiry is narrowly focused on the persecution and protection of the particular claimant. ...").
127.
Vienna Convention, supra note 118, art. 33(1) ("When a treaty is authenticated in
two or more languages the text is equally authoritative in each language, unless the treaty
provides or the parties agree that, in case of divergence, a particular text shall prevail.").
128.
See Refugee Convention, supra note 2, art. l(A)(2).
See 3 LE GRAND ROBERT DE LA LANGUE FRANyAISE, supra note 12, at 11.
129.
130.
Case no. 140222, Straravecka (Commission des Recours des Refugies, Oct. 22,
1990) (Fr.). See also Case no. 312811, Chiporev (Commission des Recours des Refugies, June
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131

aroused suspicion that he or she was not in fact fearful. Likewise,
French courts do not recognize refugee status on the basis of trepidation
(or personal "intolerability") where the evidence of risk is otherwise
lacking. Even faced with highly sympathetic applicants having suffered
severe past persecution, French courts remain focused on the actual risk
of being persecuted; in such cases, an applicant's trepidation does not,
for example, trump evidence of changed circumstances. 132
Swiss courts have adopted an approach that is also squarely directed
to analysis of actual risk. 133 Although the jurisprudence acknowledges a
subjective component in "craignant avec raison," this aspect of the test is
confined to analysis of particularized evidence of risk and involves no
substantive consideration of subjective fear. 134 Neither do Francophone
courts in Belgium require subjective fear as a prerequisite to refugee
status. In the vast majority of cases, the applicant's prospective risk of
being persecuted is the decisive factor in the "craignant avec raison" inquiry.135 Only in exceedingly rare cases do Belgian courts seem inclined
136
to use evidence of intense fear to supplement an otherwise weak case.
17, 1997) (Fr.) (UNHCR Retworld 2004 CD-ROM, issue 13) (granting refugee protection
after citing strong objective evidence, without any genuine inquiry into subjective fear); Case
no. 226842, Hoyam Tawfig (Commission des Recours des Refugies, Sept. 15, 1992) (Fr.)
(examining only objective evidence to find that well-founded fear has been established); Case
no. 313783, Tshikuta Nyamabo (Commission des Recours des Refugies, Nov. 5, 1997) (Fr.)
(UNHCR Retworld 2004 CD-ROM, issue 13).
131.
In Straravecka, for instance, the Commission observed that the applicant had left
Albania with a valid passport and visa-a circumstance that other jurisdictions have seized on
to assert that the applicant lacked the required subjective fear. Nevertheless, the Commission
recognized refugee status, noting that the applicant "doit etre regarde eu egard a la gravite des
persecutions subies, comme craignant avec raison ...." Case no. 140222, Straravecka (Commission des Recours des Refugies, Oct. 22, 1990) (Fr.).
132.
The 2002 Miry case is illustrative of this approach. In Miry, an Afghani applicant
had been subjected to horrible persecution, including torture, under the Taliban regime. The
applicant was nevertheless denied protection as a refugee in France on grounds that the Taliban regime had since fallen from power. ("[N]i les pieces de dossier ni Jes declarations faites
en seances publique ... ne permettent de tenir pour fondees les craintes actuelles et personnelles de persecutions enoncees par le requerant en cas de retour dans son pays d'origine,
compte tenu des changements politiques qui ont eu lieu en Afghanistan et qui se sont traduits
par la chute des regimes auxquels ii impute Jes persecutions dont ii aurait ete victime."). Case
no. 400706, Miry (Commission des Recours des Refugies, June 14, 2002) (Fr.).
Ktilin, supra note 24, at 28.
133.
See, e.g., N.K. et famille, EMARK 1997/10 66, at 73 (Asylum App. Comm., Oct.
134.
21, 1996) (Switz.) (In identifying the relevance,of both subjective and objective components to
the "craignant avec raison" standard, concerning the subjective inquiry, the court instructed
that account should be taken of the applicant's personal history, in particular of past persecution, and of his or her membership of ethnic, religious, social or political groups that exposed
him to such measures. The court made clear that these "subjective" factors were to be considered (alongside "objective" factors) in determining whether a reasonable person in the
applicant's position would fear persecution.).
135.
Gaetan de Moffarts, Report from Belgium (Permanent Appeals Commission for
Refugees, Jan. 29, 2003) ("In the great majority of cases treated by the Commission, the
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It is of course true that the usual practice of civil law courts not to
elaborate legal reasoning at length makes it difficult to discern with
precision the rationale for the commitment of Francophone jurisprudence
to a fundamentally risk-oriented interpretation of "craignant avec raison."
Yet it is unmistakable that courts interpreting the equally authoritative
version of the Convention have not undertaken the "trepidation journeys"
which characterize practice in most jurisdictions where the English
language text is relied upon. Francophone courts have clearly adopted an
interpretation of "craindre" that emphasizes its anticipatory rather than its
emotive qualities.
Prevailing practice under the French language text is an important
factor to be considered in determining the meaning to be given to the
notion of "well-founded fear." The terms in the refugee definition "are
137
presumed to have the same meaning in each authentic text." Thus, if
"craindre" and "fear" have the same meaning, and if subjective trepidation is not considered relevant to satisfaction of the French language test,
it follows that the textual argument for seeing use of the term "fear" as
necessarily predicating refugee status on the existence of trepidation is
significantly weakened. This, in turn, should direct attention back to the
38
object and purpose of the Refugee Convention which,' as noted above,
are oriented to an understanding of refugee status that is focused on protection from actual risk of being persecuted.

C. Internal Consistency
An understanding of "fear" as forward-looking expectation of harm
is further confirmed by the structure of the Convention, in particular Article 1(C)( 5-6), 139 which authorizes the cessation of refugee status

notion 'well-founded fear' encompasses as well an objective as a subjective dimension. Most
decisions will thus be based on an analysis, a balancing of both elements. It has to be said that
the objective dimension remains a determinant factor in the decision process to grant or not to
grant the refugee status.") (emphasis added); See also Case no. 02-1456/E458 (Vaste Beroepscommissie voor Vluchtelingen, Dec. 13, 2002) (Belg.) (considering both objective and
subjective elements, but relying principally on strong objective evidence to assess wellfounded fear); Case No. 00-1530/Fl 191 (Commission Permanente de Recours des Refugies,
Apr. 6, 2001) (Belg.) (assessing risk based on individuated, objective evidence without discussing subjective fear); Case No. 00-0749/FI093 (Commission Permanente de Recours des
Refugies, Dec. 14, 2000) (Belg.) (stating that the strong objective evidence in this case is
sufficient to establish well-founded fear, without a genuine discussion of subjective fear).
136.
See Case No. 00-1561/Fl091 (Commission Permanente de Recours des Refugies,
Dec. 8, 2000) (Belg.).
137.
Vienna Convention, supra note 118, art. 33(3).
138.
Id. art. 33(4).
139.
Refugee Convention, supra note 2, art. l(C)(5-6), which state that the Convention
ceases to apply if:
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without regard to an applicant's mental state. Under this cessation
clause, states may revoke protection where the conditions that gave rise
to the need for protection have "ceased to exist." 140
It is particularly noteworthy that Article 1(C) does not provide for
cessation of refugee status upon dissipation of the applicant's subjective
fear. If the drafters had intended the test for well-founded fear to require
a demonstration of both objective risk and subjective fear, they would
logically have provided for cessation of status where either essential
element of the well-founded fear test was no longer met. The fact that
cessation is authorized only where the evidence points to the elimination
of the objective risk of harm, and not where an applicant ceases to have a
subjective fear of being persecuted, offers strong support for an under141
standing of "well-founded fear" fundamentally oriented to actual risk.
More generally, the notion that subjective fear should play no substantive role in the assessment of well-founded fear is bolstered by the
fact that the cessation criteria under Article l(C)(5-6) do not contemplate a dispensation from cessation due to change of actual
circumstances to accommodate persons who remain subjectively fearful
142
of return. While UNHCR has proposed that the humanitarian proviso
143
established in the case of pre-World War II refugees should be
(5) He can no longer, because the circumstances in connexion with which he has
been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail himself of the protection of the country of his nationality;
(6) Being a person who has no nationality he is, because of the circumstances in
connexion with which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist,
able to return to the country of his former habitual residence;
140.
Refugee Convention, supra note 2, art. l(C)(5-6); see also U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, The lntematioTWl Protection of Refugees: Interpreting Article 1 of the
1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 20 REFUGEE SuRv. Q. 77, 93 (Oct. 2001)
("Cessation of refugee status may be understood as, essentially, the mirror of the reasons for
granting such status found in the inclusion elements of Article l(A)(2). When those reasons
disappear, in most cases so too will the need for international protection.")[hereinafter interpreting Article l].
141.
See R. v. Sec'y of State for the Horne Dep't, Ex pane Yogathas, [2002] 4 All E.R.
800, 830 (H.L. 2002) (Scott, L.J.) (U.K.) ("Refugee status is a temporary status for as long as
the risk of persecution remains.").
HATHAWAY, supra note 7, at 69 ("[The fundamentally objective focus] is buttressed
142.
by the fact that the Convention provides for the cessation.of refugee status upon the establishment of safe conditions in the country of origin, whether or not the refugee continues to
harbour a subjective fear of return.").
143.
Article l(C)(5-6) allows statutory refugees to retain their refugee status under certain conditions: "Provided that this paragraph shall not apply to a refugee falling under section
A( 1) of this article who is able to invoke compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution for refusing to avail himself of the protection of the country of nationality." Refugee
Convention, supra note 2, art. l(C)(5-6). Such a position has been incorporated in the contemporary approaches of Canada and the United States, where asylum law or regulations
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144

extended to contemporary refugees as well, there is no requirement in
the Refugee Convention to do so. The English Court of Appeal has recently considered precisely this question and concluded that although
"[i]t would be understandable if some states had decided to apply the
["compelling reasons"] principle to all Convention refugees for admirable humanitarian reasons[,] that does not amount to a recognition of a
legal obligation to do so ... Aspirations are to be distinguished from
legal obligations." 145
Beyond the fact that subjective fearfulness appears irrelevant both to
the cessation of refugee status and to exemption from cessation based
upon the dissipation of actual risk, it is noteworthy that the most important right that accrues to refugees-the protection from refoulement
146
(return) under Article 33 of the Convention -also has no relation to
subjective fear. Article 33 limits its protection to persons whose "life or
freedom would be threatened" for a Convention reason. As Weis affirms,
the drafters intended this expression to serve as a shorthand for the full
147
refugee definition set out in Article l(A)(2) of the Convention. The
decidedly objective thrust of this core duty therefore affords further support for an interpretation of the notion of well-founded fear that is
oriented to the protection of persons actually at risk.

provide all refugees with continued refugee protection, despite a change in their home country,
if the refugee can show compelling reasons arising from past persecution for refusing to return
to their home country. See U.S. Immigration Regulations, 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(l)(iii)(a)
(2005); Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, ch. 27, S.C. 2001, § 108(4) (Can.).
144.
UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 4, 'lI 136 ("The reference to Article IA (I) indicates that the exception applies to 'statutory refugees.' At the time when the 1951 Convention
was elaborated, these formed the majority of refugees. The exception, however, reflects a
more general humanitarian principle, which could also be applied to refugees other than statutory refugees.").
145.
R. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, Ex parte Hoxha, [2002] E.W.C.A. Civ.
(C.A. 2002) (Keene, L.J.) (Eng.).
146.
In relevant part, Article 33 provides: "No Contracting State shall expel or return
('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion." Refugee Convention, supra note 2, art. 33(1).
"The words 'where their life or freedom was threatened' may give the impression
147.
that another standard is required than for refugee status in Article 1. This is, however, not the
case. The Secretariat draft referred to refugees 'escaping from persecution' and to the obligation not to turn back refugees 'to the frontier of their country of origin, or to territories where
their life or freedom would be threatened on account of their race, religion, nationality, or
political opinions.' In the course of drafting the words 'country of origin', 'territories where
their life or freedom was threatened' and 'country in which he is persecuted' were used interchangeably ... [T]here was no intention to introduce more restrictive criteria than that of
'well-founded fear of persecution' used in Article l(A)(ii)." PAUL WEIS, THE REFUGEE CONVENTION, 1951 303 (1995).
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ENSURING ATTENTION TO THE APPLICANT'S CASE

Each of the understandings of a subjective element critiqued in Part I
views an applicant's subjective fear as a factor worthy of consideration,
either as an essential element or as a "plus factor." In contrast, some support exists for a more diffuse form of subjective element intended merely
to particularize the inquiry into actual risk, without substantive consideration of fear. Indeed, there are three distinct approaches which accept
that the sole focus of the well-founded fear inquiry is an analysis of the
actual risk of being persecuted, yet which posit the necessity of a subjective element to give pride of place to the unique circumstances of
persons claiming Convention refugee status.
One such understanding sees the subjective element as necessary to
ensure the substantive admissibility of evidence adduced by an applicant,
including his or her testimony (the assumption being that without a subjective element, only externally generated evidence of risk would be
taken into account). At the core of this understanding of the subjective
element is a presumed categorical distinction between evidence adduced
by the applicant, deemed "subjective" evidence, and evidence from
other, "more objective" sources. The Swiss case of N.K. et famille is illustrative of this approach. The court there observed that the subjective
element allowed "account [to] be taken of the applicant's personal history, in particular of past persecution, and of his or her membership in
ethnic, religious, social or political groups that exposed him to such
148
measures." The court made clear that these "subjective" factors were to
be considered (alongside "objective" factors) in determining whether a
"reasonable person" in the applicant's position would fear being persecuted.149
A second way that a subjective element may be thought to particularize the inquiry into well-founded fear is by prioritizing the applicant's
testimony. Under this approach, the subjective element functions not just
to ensure the admission of the applicant's testimony, but actually requires that such evidence be accorded enhanced weight in the
assessment of risk. The UNHCR Handbook offers some support for this
understanding of the subjective element:

148.
N.K. et famille, EMARK 1997/10 66, at 73 (Asylum App. Comm., Oct. 21, 1996)
(Switz.) (unofficial translation). Goodwin-Gill has similarly observed that "[w]hat seems to be
intended [by the subjective element] is not so much ... subjective fear, as evidence of the
subjective aspects of an individual's life, including beliefs and commitments." Guy GoooWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 40-41 (2d. ed. 1996).
149.
N.K. et famille, EMARK 1997/10 66, at 73-74 (Asylum App. Comm., Oct. 21,
1996) (Switz.) (unofficial translation).
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Determination of refugee status will therefore primarily require
an evaluation of the applicant's statements rather than a judgment on the situation prevailing in his country of origin. To the
element of fear-a state of mind and a subjective condition-is
added the qualification "well-founded." This implies that it is not
only the frame of mind of the person concerned that determines
his refugee status, but that this frame of mind must be supported
150
by an objective situation.
The rationale for this understanding of the subjective element appears to be that the applicant's testimony constitutes the "best evidence"
of risk. 151 Thus, so long as credibility is established and the applicant's
testimony shows that he or she meets the substantive requirements of the
refugee definition, status should ordinarily be recognized. In essence,
this understanding of the subjective element aims to protect individuals
who face a real but unverifiable risk of future persecution. The implicit
assumption is that such persons would be denied refugee status but for
the existence of a subjective element.
A third version of the thesis that there is a subjective elementthough not one that involves consideration of subjective fear-suggests
that a subjective element is the means by which an applicant's particular
vulnerabilities (psychological or physical) are afforded substantive consideration in determining whether the anticipated harm rises to the level
of persecution. The subjective element is conceived as the means to personalize the inquiry into well-founded fear by allowing decisionmakers
to distinguish between applicants facing the same treatment, but whose
particular physical or psychological make-up render them differentially
at-risk of being persecuted. A subjective element that allows for consideration of particularized susceptibilities is said to be necessary so that
decisionmakers can properly estimate the probability that a specific applicant will be subject to adverse treatment amounting to persecution if
returned to his or her country of origin:
There may be instances where ... objective circumstances in
themselves do not appear to be compelling, but taking into account the individual's own background, belief system, and
REFUGEE HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 'll'l! 37-38.
In theory, this premise applies with equal force to every case, even those in which
persuasive non-testimonial evidence of risk is available. As a practical matter, however, it
would be unnecessary to give greater weight to an applicant's testimony unless evidence from
"more objective" sources is ambiguous or incomplete. The UNHCR Handbook accordingly
instructs that "[d]ue to the importance that the definition attaches to the subjective element, an
assessment of credibility is indispensable where the case is not sufficiently clear from the facts
on record." Id. 'l[ 41.

150.
151.
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activities, the circumstances may well indeed be considered as
substantiating a well-founded fear for that individual, although
the objective circumstances might not be so considered for another.152
The need for a subjective element to validate particularized vulnerabilities has been posited in particular where an applicant seeks to
establish a well-founded fear of being persecuted based on restrictions
on his or her religious freedom. In such cases, UNHCR regards the existence of a subjective element as the means by which account can be
taken of an applicant's background and beliefs to determine whether the
inability to practice his or her religion amounts to persecution:
Fear ... is the subjective element of the definition. To assess
whether it is present or not, it is important to interview in
depth-to obtain all possible information about the applicant's
background. Do not forget that two persons, in the same "objective" situation, may react differently; for example, the inability
to practice one's religion may make life intolerable for one individual, but not for another of the same religion. (UNHCR
153
Handbook paras. 40, 22). In this case, fear is clearly present.
Underlying this approach is the assumption that, without a subjective
element, refugee status would be denied to applicants who risk harm
grave enough to qualify as persecution only because of the way in which
a given phenomenon impacts on a person with specific vulnerabilities.
In this section, we elaborate our view that a subjective element is not
needed in order to particularize the well-founded fear inquiry in any of
the ways described above. All evidence probative of an applicant's risk
of being persecuted is admissible to establish a well-founded fear, regardless of its origin. Thus, a subjective element is not needed in order to
ensure that evidence adduced by the applicant is taken into account. As
regards the second approach, existing doctrine already establishes an
appropriate level of deference to the applicant's testimony and other evidence. A subjective element that would go farther still, actually requiring
substantive prioritization of the applicant's testimony, is not needed and
may amount to over-compensation. Nor is a subjective element needed
to enable decisionmakers to take account of the way in which an applicant's particular susceptibilities affect the determination of what
treatment rises to the level of persecution. While such factors are rarely
relevant to the well-founded fear inquiry, the applicant's particular
152.
153.
STATUS

Interpreting Article/, supra note 140, at 80.
OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, DETERMINATION OF REFUGEE

22-23 (1989).
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physical or psychological vulnerabilities are appropriately taken into
account as part of the analysis of whether the harm anticipated rises to
the level of a risk of "being persecuted."
A. Admissibility of the Applicant's Evidence
Implicit in the view that a subjective element is needed to allow for
the admission of individuated evidence of risk is an assumption that
evidence adduced by the applicant is qualitatively different than
externalized evidence garnered from more detached sources. Likewise, it
is assumed that without a subjective element refugee status would be
denied to persons who, for whatever reason, face a risk greater than would
be revealed by the so-called objective (externally generated) evidence
alone. It is thus predicated on a categorical distinction between so-called
"subjective evidence" and externally generated evidence from "more
objective" sources.
In truth, however, no such categorical distinctions among different
forms of evidence exist. Rather, all evidence probative of an applicant's
risk of being persecuted is to be admitted as part of the assessment of
actual risk and accorded the weight due it on the merits. The only appropriate distinction is between relevant evidence, which is admissible, and
irrelevant evidence, which is inadmissible. The source of that evidence is
simply immaterial. This point was made by Sedley L.J. in the English
Court of Appeal decision in Karanakaran:
[D]ecision-makers, on classic principles of public law, are required to take everything material into account. Their sources of
information will frequently go well beyond the testimony of the
applicant and include in-country reports, expert testimony andsometimes-specialized knowledge of their own (which must of
course be disclosed). No probabilistic cut-off operates here: everything capable of having a bearing has to be given the weight,
154
great or little, due to it.
By way of endorsing the lower court's method of analysis, Brooke
L.J. observed in Karanakaran:
What [the tribunal in Kaja] 155 decided was that when assessing
future risk decisionmakers may have· to take into account a
whole bundle of disparate pieces of evidence: (1) evidence they
are certain about; (2) evidence they think is probably true;
154.
Karanakaran v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2000] 3 All E.R. 449, 479 (C.A.
2000) (Sedley, L.J.) (Eng.).
155.
Kaja v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [1995] Imm. A.R. 1 (lmmigr. App. Trib.
1994) (U.K.).
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(3) evidence to which they are willing to attach some credence,
even if they could not go so far as to say it is probably true;
(4) evidence to which they are not willing to attach any credence
at all. '56
This understanding is firmly in line with the general approach to
evidence adopted across common law jurisdictions. For example, the
·U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence state that "[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible."157 "Relevant" evidence is defined as "[e]vidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable that it would
158
be without the evidence." The Australian approach is similar, with the
Evidence Act 1995 codifying the position that "[e]vidence that is relevant in a proceeding is evidence that, if it were accepted, could rationally
affect (directly or indirectly) the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue in the proceeding .... [E]vidence that is relevant
159
in a proceeding is admissible in the proceeding." The approach of the
United Kingdom is analogous:
[E]vidence is that which may be placed before the court in order
that it may decide the issues of fact. ... [T]he facts which may
be proved in a judicial inquiry are facts in issue and facts relevant to the issue, and any facts, whether relevant to tfie issue or
not, which affect the legal reception or weight of the evidence
tendered. [Facts relevant to the issue] ... are facts which tend,
either directly or indirectly, to prove or disprove a fact in issue. 160
This basic principle is likewise reflected in Canadian law, where "[a]
fact will be relevant not only where it relates directly to the fact in issue,
but also where it proves or renders probable the past, present or future
existence (or non-existence) of any fact in issue." 161 Because these
156.
Karanakaran v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2000] 3 All E.R. 449, 459 (C.A.
2000) (Brooke, L.J.) (Eng.). This paper does not consider the argument that evidence that has
no credence should be considered admissible.
FED. R. EVID. 402.
157.
158.
Id. at 401.
159.
Evidence Act, 1995, §§ 55-56 (Aust!.).
160.
L.C. PHIPSON, PHIPSON ON EVIDENCE§§ l.03, 6.0'1, 6.03 (M.N. Howard et al. eds.,
15th ed. 2000). See also RUTH CANNON & NIALL NELIGAN, EVIDENCE I (2002) ("An item of
evidence may be defined as something that tends to prove or disprove a particular fact, in the
sense that it makes the existence or non-existence of that fact more likely. An alternative definition of evidence describes it as information that may be used to help prove or disprove the
truth or existence of some matter in legal proceedings.").
JOHN SOPINKA ET AL., THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN CANADA 24 (1992). See also
161.
JAMES C. MORTON, POCKET GUIDE TO EVIDENCE 4 (2d ed. 2002) (citing R. v. Arp, [1998] 3
S.C.R. 339, ')[ 38 (Can. 1998) ("The basic rule is that all relevant evidence is admissible. Relevance depends directly on the facts in issue in any particular case ... The evidence must
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general principles of evidence are logically applied to refugee law, it is
clear that-even without a subjective element-evidence adduced by the
applicant must be considered (along with all other probative evidence) in
162
an analysis of the forward-looking risk of being persecuted.
Not only is a subjective element unnecessary to secure the substantive admissibility of evidence adduced by the applicant, but there is a
real concern that continued reference to "subjective" and "objective"
evidence may actually interfere with the duty of decisionmakers to devote equivalent attention to all forms of evidence, regardless of their
origin, 163 and to accord weight to each piece of evidence based only on
its probative worth. Properly understood, evidence adduced by the applicant and evidence from "more objective" sources are different in kind,
but not in quality. Yet, the classification of evidence as subjective or objective based on its source creates de facto an evidentiary hierarchy
under which decisionmakers may be led to overvalue "objective" evidence and devalue evidence labeled "subjective."
Fundamentally, "objective" and "subjective" are not neutral adjec164
tives used merely as a matter of convenience. This is obvious even
simply tend to 'increase or diminish the probability of the existence of a fact in issue.' ... As a
consequence, there is no minimum probative value required for evidence to be relevant.").
162.
The New Zealand approach to well-founded fear is illustrative. In 1996, that jurisdiction adopted an approach solely concerned with risk under which subjective fear is not required
and no other substantive role is accorded to a subjective element. Even without a subjective element, New Zealand decisionrnakers routinely consider all information probative of the risk of
being persecuted. Moreover, under the New Zealand Immigration Act, it is irrelevant to the issue
of admissibility whether evidence is adduced by the applicant in the form of oral testimony or
documents, or whether it comes from more "independent" sources such as NGO or government reports concerning country conditions:
For the purpose of determining a claim [for refugee status], an officer(a) May seek information from any source; but
(b) Is not obliged to seek any information, evidence, or submissions further to that
provided by the claimant; and
(c) May determine the claim on the basis of the information, evidence, and submissions provided by the claimant.
New Zealand Immigration Act, 1987, § 129(G)(6) (N.Z.).
163.
For instance, the High Court of Australia in Wu Shan Liang acknowledged that "the
decision-maker must not, by a process of factual findings on particular elements of the material which is provided, foreclose reasonable speculation upon the chances of persecution
emerging from a consideration of the whole of the material." Minister for Immigr. and Ethnic
Aff. v. Wu Shan Liang, [1996] 136 A.LR. 481, 507 (Austl. 1996) (Kirby, J.).
"The Western legal tradition sees the world in dichotomous terms, such as: ra164.
tional/irrational; thought/feeling; objectivity/subjectivity; abstract thinking/contextual thinking.
Law adopts this dualism, and in each of these cases it gives preference to the former over the
latter. In other words, 'the rational, the intellectual, the objective and the abstract decision is the
preferred and superior style of decision making.'" LocATING LAW: RAcE/CLAss!GENDER CONNECTIONS 24 (Elizabeth Cormack ed., 1999) (citing NGAIRE NAFFINE, LAW AND THE SEXES:
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from a strictly linguistic perspective. "Objective" is defined as "external
to the mind; real." 165 The word "subjective," by contrast, is defined as
166
"existing in the mind only; ... illusory, fanciful." If there is truly a
meaningful distinction between evidence labeled as "objective" and evidence labeled as "subjective," it must be because the former is, by
nature, more rational, more reliable, and more probative than the latter. It
would therefore be understandable that the legal mind might be inclined
to prefer the "objective" over the "subjective." Yet it surely follows that
the result of a decision to classify evidence adduced by applicants for
refugee status as "subjective" is that it is unlikely to receive the weight
due it on the basis of a non-categorical appraisal of its probative worth.
B. Taking the Applicant's Evidence Seriously

To say that all evidence, regardless of its source, is entitled to be
considered based on its actual probative worth is not, of course, to say
that every piece of evidence must be accorded the same weight in the
assessment of actual risk. The English Court of Appeal, in Karanakaran,
clarified that "[w]hat the decision-makers ultimately make of the material is a matter for their own conscientious judgment, so long as the
procedure by which they approach and entertain it is lawful and fair, and
167
provided their decision logically addresses the Convention issues." In
contrast, the second variant of a (non-fear-based) subjective element
suggests that it is appropriate for an applicant's credible testimony not
only to be taken into account, but actually to be treated as a stronger or
more reliable form of evidence.
In part, this approach raises the same concerns just addressed. While
the intent here is to advantage the evidence adduced by refugees by means
of a categorical distinction that favors their evidence, it is still a formalist,
categorical distinction not predicated on a qualitative assessment of the
actual probative worth of the evidence. As such, it runs afoul of the duty of
decisionmakers to give equal attention to all forms of admissible
EXPLORATIONS IN FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE 26 (1990)). See also ROY L. BROOKS, STRUCTURES OF JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING FROM LEGAL FORMALISM TO CRITICAL THEORY 31
(2002) ("[Max] Weber believed that highly evolved legal systems are in this sense "rational"
rather than "irrational". They are, in other words, legal systems with value-free judicial processes."); ANDREI MARMOR, POSITIVE LAW AND OBJECTIVE VALUES 147(2001) ("One of
Marx's main insights about the law is the twofold claim that the law must present itself as an
objective, unbiased arbitrator of disputes and that it systematically fails to meet this challenge.
According to Marx and later Marxists, law's claim to objectivity in this respect is one of its
main ideological aspects").
165.
IO OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 2, at 643.
166.
8 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 2, at 33.
167.
Karanakaran v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, (2000] 3 All E.R. 449, 477 (C.A.
2000) (Sedley, L.J.) (Eng.).
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evidence, and to assign weight based solely on their "conscientious
judgment" of the relative value of each item of evidence to the overall
assessment of risk. ··
Advocacy of this variant of the subjective element thesis is likely
rooted in a desire to overcome what may be thought to be the predisposition of some decisionmakers to give short shrift to claims in which the
applicant's testimony constitutes most or all of the evidence of risk. A
clear answer has already emerged in the jurisprudence, however, and, in
some cases, codified laws of state parties: it is now generally recognized
that an applicant's credible oral testimony may constitute the whole of
168
the evidence in support of his or her claim. Canadian courts, for instance, recognize that by swearing to the truth of her statements, the
applicant creates "a presumption that [her] allegations are true unless
169
there be reason to doubt their truthfulness." Similarly, New Zealand
refugee decisionmakers do not require external corroboration if the ap110
plicant's testimony is plausible, credible and frank. U.S. Immigration
Regulations state that "the testimony of the applicant, if credible, may be
111
sufficient to sustain the burden of proof without corroboration," a position which has led the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals repeatedly to
assert the duty to consider whether an applicant's "credible testimony
alone [is] sufficient to establish her eligibility for asylum and/or with172
holding removal." In view of such clear affirmations of the real value
of an applicant's testimonial evidence, it is difficult to understand the
propriety of going farther still to insist that a subjective element is
needed in order to ensure that such evidence effectively trumps other
evidence adduced. In some cases, official or non-governmental reports
on human rights conditions may be more probative of an applicant's risk
than information supplied by the applicant, if only because the applicant's range of experience or depth of knowledge provides only a partial
picture of overall risk. 173 Similarly, an applicant's evidence of what has
168.
HATHAWAY, supra note 7, at 84.
169.
Sathanandan v. Can. (Minister of Employment and Immigr.), No. A-645-90, 'JI 3
(Fed. Ct. App. 1991) (Mahoney, J.) (Can.) (quoting Moldonado v. Can. (Minister of Employment and Immigr.), [1980] 2 F.C. 302, 305 (Fed. Ct. App. 1979) (Can.)).
170.
In Refugee Appeal No. 265192, the Refugee Status Appeals Authority acknowledged
that it is unreasonable "to attack [an applicant's] credibility on the basis that documentary
evidence in support of the claim [is not] produced." The Authority further held: "[C]learly
there must be valid reasons to doubt the credibility of an applicant and there is no requirement
that testimony which is plausible, credible and frank must be supported by external corroboration." Refugee Appeal No. 265/92, Re SA (Refugee Status Appeals Auth.) (Haines, Deputy
Chair) (N.Z.).
171.
U.S. Immigration Regulations, 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (2005).
172.
Abdule v. Ashcroft, 47 Fed. Appx. 463, 465 (9th Cir. 2002).
173.
In Dudar v. Canada, for instance, the Federal Court of Canada rightly held that "[i]t
was open to the Board to prefer the documentary evidence over that of the Applicant," so long
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occurred to him or her will logically be of less value than general human
rights data where the issue in a case is whether conditions in the applicant's country of origin have changed since his or her departure, such
that a risk that was once clearly well-founded may presently be unsubstantiated.174
C. Attention to Particular Susceptibilities
A subjective element has also been said to be necessary in order to
enable decisionmakers to take account of particularized vulnerabilities
(both physical and psychological) that may result in a given applicant
experiencing more severe harm than other persons subject to the same
objective circumstances. In our view, such concerns are relevant, but not
normally pertinent to the well-founded fear inquiry. Rather, evidence of
an applicant's susceptibility to increased harm is appropriately considered as part of the analysis of whether the substantive harm feared
amounts to a risk of "being persecuted." In contrast to the well-founded
fear determination, which essentially speaks to the degree of risk, the
evaluation of whether the harm is or is not persecutory is oriented precisely to the ascertainment and evaluation of the impact of a given act or
threat of action on the well-being of the applicant.
In this section, we elaborate our position that an analysis of "being
persecuted" grounded in international human rights law allows
decisionmakers fully and adequately to take account of particularized risks
of harm, without any need for a subjective element. International human
rights law recognizes that individuals facing the same external
phenomenon may experience harm differently, and thus may be
differentially at risk of being persecuted because of their unique
characteristics. In particular, international human rights law's recognition
that extreme forms of psychological harm amount to "cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment" allows such harms to be classified as forms of
persecution. There is therefore no need to invoke a fungible subjective
element to do justice to the protection needs of persons at risk of such
forms of harm.
Refugee law emerged from, and is situated within, the broader context of international human rights law. As much is clear from the
as it gave clear reasons why it had chosen to do so. Dudar v. Can. (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigr.), [2002] F.C.T. 1277, 'lI 20 (Fed. Ct. Trial Div. 2002) (Snider, J.) (Can.).
174.
''A judgment must be made as to what may happen in the future, including any
change in current circumstances .... There may be no current risk of persecution on a Refugees Convention ground, yet a change in circumstances may readily be foreseen that would
create a significant risk of persecution on such a ground." Minister for lmmigr. & Multicultural Aff. v. Jama, [1999] F.C.A. 1680, 'lI 24 (Full Fed. Ct. 1999) (Branson & Sackville, JJ.)
(Aust!.).
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Preamble to the Refugee Convention, which constitutes a key part of the
175
treaty's context to be taken into account in its interpretation:
Considering that the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights approved on 10 December
1948 by the General Assembly have affirmed the principle that
human beings shall enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms
without discrimination; Considering that the United Nations has,
on various occasions manifested its profound concern for refugees and endeavored to assure refugees the widest possible
exercise of these fundamental rights and freedoms . . . Have
agreed as follows ... 176
Indeed, the House of Lords expressly relied on the Refugee Convention's Preamble to determine that when assessing the viability of a
refugee applicant's claim, it is crucial that the international human rights
context frames the process. After quoting the first four sections of the
preamble of the Refugee Convention, Lord Steyn wrote in the leading
case of Shah and Islam that:
The relevance of the preambles is twofold. First, they expressly
show that a premise of the Convention was that all human beings
shall enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms. Secondly, and
more pertinently, they show that counteracting discrimination,
which is referred to in the first preamble, was a fundamental
purpose of the convention. That is reinforced by the reference in
the first preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
177

Leading refugee jurisprudence of other states confirms the centrality
of international human rights law to an authentic understanding of refugee law. In one of the earliest formulations, the Supreme Court of
Canada held in its seminal decision of Ward that "[u]nderlying the Convention is the international community's commitment to the assurance of
175.
"An obvious internal source of reference is the preamble to the treaty. The preamble
is a principal and natural source from which indications can be gathered of a treaty's objects
and purposes even though the preamble does not contain substantive provisions. Article 31(2)
of the Vienna Convention sets this out specifically ... [and] this Court ... has made substantial use of it for interpretational purposes." Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v.
Senegal), 1991 I.C.J. 53, 142 (Mar. 2, 1990) (Weeramantry, J., dissenting). The decisions cited
in which the International Court of Justice has relied upon the preamble to a treaty for interpretive purposes include: Rights of Nationals of the United States in Morocco (Fr. v. U.S.),
1952 l.C.J. 176, 196 (Aug. 27); and Asylum Case (Colom. v. Peru) 1950 l.C.J. 266, 282 (Nov.
20).
176.
Refugee Convention, supra note 2, Preamble.
177.
R v. lmmigr. App. Trib., Ex parte Shah, [ 1999] 2 All E.R. 545, 551 (H.L. 1999)
(Steyn, L.) (U.K.).
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178

basic human rights without discrimination." Similarly, Gleeson, C.J.,
of the High Court of Australia has also affirmed that refugee law must be
interpreted within the broader context of international human rights law,
stating:
The purpose and content [of the Convention] can, in tum, only
be understood by reference to the history and broad humanitarian
object of the Convention .... [I]ts meaning should be ascertained
having regard to its object, bearing in mind that the Convention is
one of several important international treaties designed to redress
"violation[s] of basic human rights demonstrative of a failure of
•
,,179
state protecuon.
In practice, the anchoring of refugee law in the human rights context
has proved particularly valuable in facilitating an evolving understanding
180
of the core construct of a risk of "being persecuted." In the Ward decision, for example, the Supreme Court of Canada observed that
"'[p]ersecution' ... undefined in the Convention, has been ascribed the
meaning of 'sustained or systemic violation of basic human rights de181
monstrative of a failure of state protection.' " Lord Bingham recently
observed in the House of Lords that the concept of persecution must be
understood within the greater context of international human rights, specifically that "it is necessary to investigate whether the treatment which
the applicants reasonably fear would infringe a recognized human
182
right." The new European Union Qualification Directive similarly defines a risk of being persecuted as involving the risk of acts which are
178.
Ward v. Attorney General, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 'll 7l(Can. 1993) (La Forest, J.).
179.
Minister for Immigr. and Multicultural Aff. v. Khawar, [2002] 67 A.L.D. 577, 'll 111
(Aust!. 2002) (quoting HATHAWAY, supra note 7, at 104-105).
180.
For example, Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States have
all produced guidelines that advance the notion that the interpretation of gender-based persecution in refugee law should be informed by fundamental human rights. See Deborah E.
Anker, Refugee Law, Gender, and the Human Rights Paradigm, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 133,
139 (2002). See also Australian Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Refugee
and Humanitarian Visa Applicants: Guidelines on Gender Issues for Decision Makers (July
1996), available at http://refugeelawreader.org/files/pdf/172.pdf; Canadian Immigration and
Refugee Board, Guideline 4: Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution
(updated Nov. 13, 1996), available at http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/about/guidelines/
women_e.htm; Nathalia Berkowitz & Catriona Jarvis, Immigration Appellate Authority: Asylum Gender Guidelines (Nov. 2000), available at www.iaa.gov.uk/gender.pdf; Memorandum
from Phyllis Coven, Office of International Affairs, Considerations For Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims From Women (May 26, 1995), available at http://
sierra.uchastings.edu/cgrs/law/guidelines/us.pdf.
181.
Ward v. Attorney General, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 'JI 72(Can. 1993) (La Forest, J.)
(quoting HATHAWAY, supra note 7, at 104-05).
182.
Sepet v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2003] 3 All E.R. 304, 312 (H.L. 2003)
(Bingham, L.) (U.K.).
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"sufficiently serious by their nature or repetition as to constitute a severe
violation of basic human rights, in particular the rights from which dero183
gation cannot be made." And in a particularly thoughtful passage,
Justice Kirby of the High Court of Australia recently reversed his own
position on the meaning of "being persecuted" to come into line with the
international trend to ground determinations of persecution in the norms
of human rights law:
I am now inclined to see more clearly than before the dangers in
the use of dictionary definitions of the word 'persecuted' in the
Convention definition .... Dictionary definitions can ... incorrectly direct the mind of the decisionmaker to the intention of
the persecutor instead of to the effect on the persecuted ....
. . . [The Refugee Convention's] meaning should be ascertained
having regard to its object, bearing in mind that the Convention
is one of several important international treaties designed to redress 'violation[s] of basic human rights, demonstrative of a
failure of state protection.' It is the recognition of the failure of
state protection, so often repeated in the history of the past hundred years, that led to the exceptional involvement of
international law in matters concerning individual human
. hts. 184
ng
While international human rights law is fundamentally concerned to
set common, universally applicable norms, the General Comments
adopted by United Nations human rights treaty bodies make clear that
the assessment of compliance with human rights obligations must take
account of the unique situations of all, in particular of those who are
most vulnerable. 185 For example, the United Nations Human Rights

183.
Council Directive 2004/83/EC on Minimum Standards for the Qualification and
Status of Third Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons Who Otherwise Need International Protection and the Content of the Protection Granted, art. 9(l}(a),
2004 OJ. (L 304) 12 [hereinafter Council Directive on Minimum Standards].
184.
Minister for Immigr. and Multicultural Aff. v. Khawar, [2002) H.C.A. 14 (Aust!.
2002) (Kirby, J.) (citations omitted).
185.
Vulnerable groups such as women, children, older persons, people with disabilities,
religious, ethnic, and cultural minorities, accused and incarcerated individuals, indigenous
people, and non-citizens often face particular and unique obstacles that can thwart their enjoyment of fundamental human rights. In their respective recommendations, the U.N.
supervisory bodies suggest specific remedies and programs that are tailored to address various
groups' specific vulnerabilities. It can be extrapolated from this approach that the protection of
universal human rights does not entail identical treatment, nor is the infringement of human
rights assessed without consideration of the identity of the complainant. The human rights
treaty bodies consist of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the Human
Rights Committee; the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination; the Commit-
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Committee has affirmed that in order to assess whether particular actions
violate the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Civil
and Political Covenant), one must examine "all circumstances of the
case such as the duration and manner of the treatment, its physical or
mental effects as well as the sex, age and state of health of the victim
186
(emphasis added)." The Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination has similarly emphasized that racial discrimination can
manifest itself in unique ways depending on the identity of the
complainant, and, in particular, on his or her gender:
There are circumstances in which racial discrimination only or
primarily affects women, or affects women in a different way, or
to a different degree than men. Such racial discrimination will
often escape detection if there is no explicit recognition or acknowledgment of the different life experiences of women and
187
men, in areas of both public and private life.
A similar attentiveness to the ways in which particular characteristics
can affect the question of whether human rights are violated can be seen
at the regional level. The European Court of Human Rights has determined that consideration of whether there has been a violation of the
European Convention on Human Rights requires consideration of "the
age, sex, and health condition of the person exposed to [the treatment]."188 In a precedent-setting decision, Zekia J. expounded on this
notion by giving an example that dramatically illustrates the relevance of
individuated vulnerabilities in determining the existence of a human
rights violation:
I can refer to the case of an elderly sick .man who is exposed to a
harsh treatment-after being given several blows and beaten to
the floor, is dragged and kicked on the floor for several hours. I
would say without hesitation that the poor man has been tortured. If such treatment is applied on a wrestler or even a young

tee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women; the Committee against Torture; and
the Committee on the Rights of the Child.
186.
Vuolanne v. Finland, Views of the Human Rights Committee under article 5, paragraph 4 of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(thirty fifth session) concerning Communication No. 26511987, at 'I[ 9.2, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/35/D/265/1987 (1989) (emphasis added).
Gender-Related Dimensions of Racial Oiscrimination, General Recommendation
187.
XXV, Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 56th sess. at 152, U.N. Doc.
N55/18 (2000).
188.
Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, 109 (1978) (Zekia, J.).
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athlete, I would hesitate a lot to describe it as an inhuman treat189
ment and I might regard it as a mere rough handling.
This approach has been imported into refugee law. The European
Union, for example, has determined that
[i]n assessing an applicant's fear of being persecuted or exposed
to other serious and unjustified harm, Member States shall take
into account . . . the individual position and personal circumstances of the applicant, including factors such as background,
gender, age, health and disabilities so as to assess the serious. or h arm. 190
ness of persecut10n
The duty to consider particularized impact in assessing refugee
status is moreover anchored in the Convention's language, which speaks
to a well-founded fear of "being persecuted," in the passive voice. As
Heerey J. of the Australian Federal Court has noted:
The use of the passive voice conveys a compound notion, concerned both with the conduct of the persecutor and the effect that
conduct has on the person being persecuted. In assessing the
probable impact of a persecutor's conduct, decisionmakers can
readily consider an applicant's unique characteristics-such as
age, health, disability, or past experience-that render him or her
191
especially vulnerable to being persecuted.
Of particular relevance to the present discussion, a human rightsbased approach to "being persecuted" allows for consideration of an applicant's psychological vulnerabilities. Indeed, international human
rights law recognizes that psychological harm, if sufficiently severe, can
amount to a human rights violation. Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights decrees that "no one shall be subjected to torture
or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." 192 This declaration is codified in binding terms in the Civil and Political Covenant,
Article 7 of which provides that "no one shall be subjected to torture or
193
to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." In its General Comment on Article 7, the Human Rights Committee makes clear
that "[t]he prohibition in Article 7 relates not only to acts that cause
189.
Id.
190.
Council Directive on Minimum Standards, supra note 183, art. 10(2).
191.
Minister for Immigr. and Multicultural and Indigenous Aff. v. Kord, [2002] 125
F.C.R. 68, 69 (Full Fed. Ct. 2002) (Heerey, J.) (Aust!.).
192.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., art. 5, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
193.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
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physical pain, but also to acts that cause mental suffering to the victim."194
In applying this standard, the Committee has determined, for example, that the mental suffering caused by the mysterious disappearance of
her daughter violated the mother's human rights:
[There was] anguish and stress caused to the mother by the disappearance of her daughter and by the continuing uncertainty
concerning her fate and whereabouts: The author has the right to
know what has happened to her daughter. In these respects, she
too is a victim of the violations of the Covenant suffered by her
195
daughter in particular, of article 7 .
Similarly, the Human Rights Committee has found that when a state
abducts someone and refuses to provide any information or allow any
outside contact with the abducted person for an inordinate amount of
time, "the removal of the victim and the prevention of contact with his
family and with the outside world constitute cruel and inhuman treatment, in violation of article 7 of the Covenant." 196 Cruel and inhuman
treatment thus encompasses extreme psychological pain, regardless of
whether physical injury was sustained.
Interpreting the notion of "being persecuted" as involving serious
harm which is in breach of international human rights law should therefore result in the recognition of cases in which there is a forward-looking
expectation of subjection to serious psychological harm, assuming of
course that this is for a Convention reason and that the state of origin
will not or cannot be relied upon to counter the risk. As the caselaw on
point demonstrates, there is no need to rely on a "subjective element" to
achieve this goal. In Katrinak, for example, the English Court of Appeal
considered the claim of a Roma man who had been attacked and injured
by skinheads, as had his visibly pregnant wife in a separate attack.
Schiemann L.J., in considering the question of whether the man had suffered persecution (additional to his own injuries) because of the attack
on his wife, observed that
194.
General Comment 20, Article 7, U.N. Human Rights Committee, reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights
Treaty Bodies at 129, 5, U.N. Doc. HRI/GENl/Rev.7 (2004).
195.
Quinteros Almeida v. Uruguay, Views of the Human Rights Committee under article
5, paragraph 4 of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (nineteenth session) concerning Communication No. 10711981, at 'II 14, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/19/D/107/1981 (1981).
196.
N'goya v. Zaire (Democratic Republic of Congo), Views of the Human Rights
Committee under article 5, paragraph 4 of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (fifty-sixth session) concerning Communication No
54211993, at 'II 5.5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/56/D/542/1993 (1993).
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the attacks also potentially evidence the appellants' vulnerability
in the future. An activity which would not amount to persecution
if done to some people may amount to persecution if done to
others. It is easier to persecute a husband whose wife has been
kicked in a racial attack whilst visibly pregnant than one whose
family has not had this experience. What to others may be an
197
unbelievable threat may induce terror in such a man.
The judgment further observed that
[i]t is possible to persecute a husband or a member of a family
by what you do to other members of his immediate family. The
essential task for the decision taker in these sort of circumstances is to consider what is reasonably likely to happen to the
wife and whether that is reasonably likely to affect the husband
198
in such a way as to amount to persecution of him.
Similarly, the U.S. Board of Immigration Appeals in Y-T-L held that
the infliction of a forced sterilization on one spouse may amount to past
199
persecution of the other spouse. While the majority finding does not
elucidate the basis for this finding, the dissent thoughtfully suggested
that "such persecution must be personal to the applicant, although the
harm to the persecuted individual may also result in grievous harm to the
applicant ... [for example] the loss of consortium of his spouse (includ200
ing the opportunity to have children)." Under this analysis, a loss of
consortium can be seen as a psychological harm amounting to persecution directly experienced by the applicant.
Most recently, the view that the risk of serious psychological harm
can be a form of persecution has been affirmed by the Federal Court of
Australia in SCAT, a case involving a family who were members of the
Sabean Mandean religious minority in Iran. The court observed that
"[i]nsofar as psychological harm to the appellant's family members,
rather than directly to himself, might have been in issue, that could
plainly be taken into account as an element of harm to the appellant himself. To harm a child may also be to harm its custodial parents."201 Thus,
in line with the approach taken in international human rights law generally, there is clear support in refugee jurisprudence for the view that
severe psychological harm, even if experienced as the indirect conse197.
Katrinak v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2001] E.W.C.A. Civ. 832, 'JI 21
(C.A. 2001) (Shiemann, L.J.) (Eng.).
198.
Id. 'JI 23.
199.
In reY-T-L, 23 I. & N. Dec. 601 (B.I.A. 2003).
Id.
200.
201.
SCAT v. Minister for Immigr. and Multicultural and Indigenous Aff., [2003] F.C.A.
80, 'JI 23 (Full Fed. Ct. 2003) (Madgwick & Conti, JJ.) (Aust!.).
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quence of harm done to others, is a form of serious harm amounting to
persecution.
The psychological impact of threats of violence and murder has also
been considered in refugee law. While threats alone are rarely found to
be extreme enough to constitute persecution, in the case of Ramos-Ortiz
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit acknowledged that extreme and plausible threats may, in and of themselves, amount to
persecution. In that case, a thirty-one year old man from Guatemala alleged that he was threatened with death if he refused to join the
guerrillas in their fight against the government. Rather than risk this fate,
he fled to the United States. The court stated in obiter dicta that
"[t]hreats alone are generally not sufficient to constitute past persecution; instead, only those threats that are so menacing in themselves that
they cause significant actual suffering or harm rise to the level of persecution."202 The implication is therefore that where death threats are
sufficiently terrorizing that they cause genuine and extreme mental suffering, they may fall within the ambit of persecution.
The intangible, but acute, psychological harm of discrimination has
been similarly recognized by refugee jurisprudence as amounting to persecution if it is extreme enough. This question was considered in the
previously cited case of SCAT. The discriminatory treatment experienced
by the Sabean Mandean minority included the denial of the right to handle food, prejudicial insults, deprivation of physical contact in greetings,
exclusion from clubs, denigration of their religion, and the possibility of
forced marriage for the women with Muslim men. The consequences of
such lifelong treatment involved feelings of insecurity and lack of control over one's life that created a grave risk of suicide. The Federal Court
of Australia found that when discrimination is extreme and relentless
from childhood, "the cumulative effect of this was likely to entail severe
psychological harm" 203 sufficient to give rise to a well-founded fear of
being persecuted.
In sum, refugee law-in line with the principles of international human rights law, which comprise part of its legal context-recognizes
both that the analysis of the gravity of harm risked by an applicant must
take account of his or her particular susceptibilities, and also that serious
forms of psychological harm may, in and of themselves, be forms of persecution. In light of these critical developments, there is today no need to

202.
Ramos-Ortiz v. Ashcroft, 70 Fed. Appx. 68, 71 (3rd Cir. 2003). See also Navas v.
INS, 217 F.3d 646, 658 (9th Cir. 2000) ("[D]eath threats alone can constitute persecution.").
203.
SCAT v. Minister for lmmigr. and Multicultural and Indigenous Aff., [2003] F.C.A.
80, 'j[ 23 (Full Fed. Ct. 2003) (Austl.).
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advocate a subjective element in "well-founded fear" in order to embrace
concerns of this kind as part of the refugee status inquiry.

IV.

CONCLUSIONS

The subjective element of the duty to show a "well-founded fear" of
being persecuted is both widely accepted and widely misunderstood.
Conceptual and linguistic confusion has resulted in a range of specific
understandings that is breathtaking in its diversity. While the initial impetus to posit such a requirement may well have been to mandate clear
attention to each individual refugee claimant's case, or to ensure that his
or specific susceptibilities be taken into account in determining whether
a sufficiently grave risk might accrue upon return, normative developments in refugee law have rendered each of these goals superfluous. In
particular, an applicant's evidence-including his or her own credible
testimony-is now understood to be at the center of the refugee status
inquiry, and to be a sufficient basis for the recognition of refugee status,
at least where corroboration is not reasonably available. The clear embrace of a human rights-based approach to the interpretation of the core
construct of a risk of "being persecuted" has moreover facilitated reliance on the risk of claimant-specific harms, including those of a
psychological nature, as legitimate grounds for the recognition of refugee status. If these were the reasons for traditional insistence on a
subjective element, the requirement may today be considered essentially
an anachronism.
But in fact, the dominant understanding of the subjective element is
not nearly so benign. To the contrary, the usual approach is to insist that
even clearly at-risk claimants must also demonstrate their subjective
trepidation in order to be granted refugee status. As we have shown, this
requirement results in the denial of international protection to a variety
of applicants who, by reason of their age, mental health, stoic nature,
gender, or culture are unable either to experience or effectively to communicate their subjective fear to the decisionmaker. The various efforts
to compensate for the clear dangers of insistence on the demonstration of
subjective fear are partial, and difficult to apply with accuracy. In particular, the several objective indicators relied upon as surrogates for the
existence of subjective trepidation are in most cases of doubtful relevance to the existence of fear, and in some instances lead to results
which contradict established principles of refugee law. In the end, there
is now clear evidence that applicants well within the class of persons
intended to the benefit from the Refugee Convention are, in practice,
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denied status as refugees by reason of the duty to show their subjective
fear.
This, then, brings us back to the fundamental question of why one
might persist in asserting a bipartite understanding of the well-founded
fear standard instead of recognizing-as we advocate here-that the
standard requires only evidence of a forward-looking expectation of actual risk.
In part, the answer seems simply to be that the word "fear" is most
commonly used to refer to trepidation. Yet as we have shown, an understanding of "fear" (and of the equally authoritative French language
notion of "craindre") that connotes forward-looking apprehension is
squarely within the accepted ordinary meaning of those terms. This more
objective understanding is moreover compelled by rules of treaty interpretation, because it both facilitates an application which coincides much
more closely with dominant practice in Francophone jurisdictions and
supports the underlying goals of the Refugee Convention itself.
Beyond the literal explanation, the primary reason for maintenance
of a two-part understanding of "well-founded fear" seems to be little
more than habit. The bifurcated position has been adopted, at least formally, in most UNHCR position papers and in the jurisprudence of
leading courts. While the breadth and depth of the attachment to the bifurcated position is no small obstacle, we believe that the increasingly
clear evidence of the serious harm it does to genuinely at-risk persons
compels a fundamental reconsideration of the established view.
There is, in fact, no textual or principled impediment to adoption of an
understanding of "well-founded fear" focused exclusively on forwardlooking apprehension; to the contrary, it is a view that is fully supported
by language and by the context, object, and purpose of the Refugee Convention. There is moreover no evidence whatsoever that a move in this
direction poses any downside risk for refugees-as practice in New Zealand, which has rejected any duty to show subjective fear or trepidation,
and adopted an understanding of "well-founded fear" focused exclusively
on prospective apprehension, makes clear. 204 This result is not surprising,
as the interpretation advanced in this Article merely eliminates one of
204.
In 1996, New Zealand formally disavowed the existence of a subjective element in
well-founded fear. The present standard, which focuses exclusively on the applicant's actual
risk, has been formulated as follows: "On the facts as found by the decision-maker: l. Objectively, is there a real chance of the refugee claimant being persecuted if returned to the country
of nationality? 2. If the answer is Yes, is there a Convention reason for that persecution?"
Refugee Appeal No. 70074/96, Re ELLM (Refugee Status Appeals Auth. 1996) (N.Z.).
By adopting this test, New Zealand courts have effectively simplified the analysis of
well-founded fear without sacrificing the ability to personalize the inquiry into risk or take
account of particular susceptibilities.
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what are now said to be two essential elements of the well-founded fear
test, rather than imposing a new or more exacting test.
The challenge, then, is to move beyond routinized deference to tradition in order to eliminate a clear and present danger to the ability of the
Refugee Convention to serve its core purpose of protecting at-risk persons from being persecuted. Whether a person is, or is not, subjectively
fearful of return to actual risk should be recognized as legally immaterial.

